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ABSTRACT
In our previous studies it has been found that a phenomenon labeled “tilting” is a form 
of moral anger. When players are in “tilt” they make a series of bad decisions, chase 
their losses and express anger by cursing their opponents. In the context of tilting, the 
players also report episodes of memory loss. Additionally, we also developed a scale 
that measures the level of a player's poker experience, and we found evidence to suggest
that poker experience is associated with mature self-reflection skills. We also found that 
the likelihood of a poker player making the correct decision in poker decision making 
tasks  increased as a function of self-reflection and poker experience. 
In Study 1 I found evidence supporting the hypothesis that the regulation of 
emotions is an important part of the skill set of poker players. Specifically, if poker 
players have read a story about betrayal where they are asked to take the position of the 
victim before they make their decisions in poker decision making tasks, they make 
mathematically worse decisions than those participants who have only read a control 
story. The effect was moderated by the presence of a pair of moving eyes placed on the 
screen, which were used as proxy for the social environment. The results support the 
hypothesis that tilting is related to moral anger, or at least some form of anger that 
seems consistent with the events taking place in the social context. 
In Study 2, I assessed the associations between the HEXACO personality 
inventory -revised and poker experience. I obtained evidence supporting the notion that 
emotional stability is positively associated with accumulated poker experience. 
In Study 3 I showed that poker experience does not seem to be correlated with 
emotional intelligence, selfishness, self-control problems, social alienation or lowered 
levels of life satisfaction. I also note that these measures correlate with instruments 
measuring problem gambling. However, I observed either no correlations, or 
correlations hinting towards health benefits, between these instruments and poker 
experience. I concluded that problem gambling instruments need further development 
Taken together our results indicate that there are numerous benefits in approaching the 
field of gambling studies from a non-clinical angle.
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TIIVISTELMÄ
Väitöskirja koostuu kolmesta osatutkimuksesta, jotka laajentavat aikaisempia 
tutkimuksiamme. Aikaisemmissa tutkimuksissamme osoitettiin että “tilttaamiseksi” 
nimetty ilmiö on moraalisen raivon muoto. Tilttaaminen on ilmiö, jossa pelaajat tekevät 
sarjan huonoja päätöksiä ja jahtaavat häviöitään ja ilmaisevat suuttumusta mm. kiroten 
kanssapelaajiaan. Tilttaamisen yhteydessä pelaajat ovat raportoineet myös muisti-
katkoksia. Lisäksi kehitimme pokerikokemusmittarin ja löysimme todistusaineistoa, 
joka vittasi pokerikokemuksen olevan yhteydessä kypsiin itsereflektiotaipumuksiin. 
Huomasimme myös kokeneiden pelaajien tekevän sitä todennäköisemmin 
matemaattisesti oikeita päätöksiä, mitä korkeampi itsereflektiotaipumus heillä on. 
Väitöskirjani enimmäisessä artikkeleissa tulokset puoltavat hypoteesia jonka 
mukaan emootioiden hallinta rationaalisten päätösten tekemi-seksi on tärkeä osa 
pokerinpelaajan taitopatteristoa. Mikäli pokerinpelaajat olivat luke-neet suuttumusta 
aiheuttavan tarinan, jossa heidän piti asettua petoksen kohteeksi joutuneen ihmisen 
asemaan, tekivät he matemaattisesti huonompia ratkaisuja ratio-naalista päätöksentekoa 
edellyttävissä pokeripäätöksentekotehtävissä. Kyseinen ilmiö oli riippuvainen siitä 
tekivätkö pelaajat päätöksiään silloin kun näytöllä oli liikkuva silmäpari. Silmäpari 
toimii vastineena pokeripelin sosiaaliselle ympäristölle. Tulokset tukevat hypoteesia että
“tilttaamisessa” olisi kyse moraalisesta raivosta
Toisessa artikkelissa arvioimme HEXACO-PI-R persoonallisuusmittarin ja 
pokerikokemuksen välisiä yhteyksiä. Tulosten mukaan emotionaalinen tasapainoisuus 
on yhteydessä pokerikokemuksen kehittymiseen. 
Kolmannessa artikkelissa toteamme ettei pokerikokemus näytä olevan 
yhteydessä alhaiseen tunneälyyn, itsekkyyteen, itsekontrolliongelmiin, syrjäytyneisyy-
teen tai alentuneeseen elämäntyytyväisyyteen. Samassa artikkelissa edellä mainitut 
ongelmat korreloivat ongelmapelaamista mittaavien instrumenttien kanssa ja ongelma-
pelaaminen näyttää korreloivan pokerikokemuksen kanssa (joka ei kuitenkaan korreloi 
negatiivisten hyvinvointivaikutusten kanssa). Toteamme, että ongelmapelaamismittarei-
ta pitänee vielä kehittää lisää.
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FOREWORD
I have a confession... I am not a poker player. I have never played a single hand of 
online poker. My academic interests in general lie somewhere in consciousness studies, 
theories of computation, emotions, rationality, morality, evolution and decision making. 
I am interested in the big questions: why are we here, why does if feel like something to
be alive, how does evolution work, why did evolution start utilizing consciousness? So 
why is my thesis about poker? Well, it isn't actually... I consider that it is a thesis about 
decision making and skill development, I just happen to observe some aspects of these 
processes with the help of poker. After all, poker is a unique game which brings 
together, rules, norms, strategies, emotions, social settings, rationality and decision 
making. Many of the things I am interested in academically take place in poker.
Originally my thesis was supposed to be on evolutionary psychology. During 
the years that I was conducting poker research with my colleague Jussi Palomäki, I also 
prepared four or five articles on evolutionary and moral psychology. One of these 
articles received such a crushing review that it can't be revived. The other three or four 
will still possibly be published in the near future. At least there is some hope for them, 
depending a bit on the details and luck encountered during the review process.
To say the least it was not expected that I would graduate with a poker related 
thesis. Life, however, has its way of taking its twists and turns and sometimes during 
those moments we just need to brace ourselves for the turbulence and hope for the best 
while the storm passes. To state it shortly, my PhD work has been a disaster. None of the
plans I made pulled through. In Amsterdam I was promised help and guidance that I 
never received and on top of that, one of my research ideas was either just blatantly 
stolen or somebody accidentally had the exact same idea... This idea I had written up in 
full in 2009 and it was part of my original research proposal for University of Helsinki. 
I mentioned this idea passing to a colleague in Amsterdam during 2012, who 
then published a set of studies (in 2014) with an almost identical design compared to the
one I had written for a course there during the previous year (2011). Later on I had 
social problems with the same colleague, and I eventually had to quit my research 
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position in Amsterdam in February of 2014.  It was becoming obvious after 18 months 
that none of my work was progressing, nor was I receiving guidance or support that 
would have been helpful for my own work – I was only being used to execute other 
peoples ideas. 
While this was going on, the poker research I had been doing on the side as a 
hobby was gathering momentum. The funny thing about poker research was, that it was 
fun. Nobody was breathing down our necks or insisting that we should do things in a 
particular way. Both of us, Jussi and I, we had our supervisors, but in practice we were 
free to do as we pleased. I can't stress this enough, we had no bosses and for all practical
purposes had complete academic freedom. We made all our judgments regarding the 
write-up, design and publication by ourselves. In my opinion, this also shows. Our body
of work is coherent, it has a clear and a logical narrative and it very nicely builds on top 
of the previous work that we have done. We have seen science progress with our own 
eyes. The results are beautiful, even if I say so myself. For instance, the article that is 
listed now as the third study of this thesis received the best paper award from the 
Journal of Gambling and Commercial Gaming Research in November of 2013 
(although for several reasons unrelated to me, its publications was delayed until 2015).  
Ironically, almost immediately after I left Amsterdam in February of 2014, I 
received news that my experimental study had been accepted for publication without 
any revisions (Study 1 of this thesis)! At that moment I was looking at my published 
work, that was progressing and I was looking at the pile of diminishing resources that I 
had stocked up – I had used up almost all of my grant money for my studies in 
Amsterdam. At that moment I started thinking that maybe, indeed, I had to just suck it 
up, cut my losses and graduate with the work I had been doing as a hobby. This was 
confirmed when my HEXACO paper (Study 2 of this thesis) was accepted for 
publication in June of 2014. The summary part of this thesis was promptly written up  
after that and was finished by the end of September 2014. At that moment I was not 
quite sure if I was happy with my work
However, I felt that maybe the decision to graduate with a poker related thesis 
had indeed been a correct one when Cyberpsychology lifted our HEXACO paper as 
their cover story for their October issue. They had also sent out a press release regarding
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this paper and it received international media attention from Greece to USA and from 
Poland to China. Finnish public radio and press had contacted us for interviews. 
According to the Altmetric.com, our short HEXACO paper received more media 
attention than 99% of science publications.
Nonetheless, I can't count the number of things that had to happen or go wrong 
for me to arrive here. My colleague Jussi also made remarks on how he was puzzled by 
the extensive streak of bad luck that was hitting me during my years as a PhD student. 
Well, in any case, my thesis turned into something I would have never expected and 
although the manuscript was finished already in September of 2014, several other things
had to go wrong before I could get it reviewed. Notwithstanding, here it is finally, ready
and polished and hot out of the press and ready to be defended. 
I hope that who ever decides to read it, enjoys at least parts of it. I have made 
my best to make it as readable as I can, and I have done my best to avoid unnecessary 
technicalities. In my opinion, science writing does not need to be rigid and boring.
With love,
--Michael Laakasuo
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1 BACKGROUND
”The problem is not to find the answer, it's to face the answer”
– Terence McKenna 
1.1. Unanswered questions in previous poker research
The previous research I was engaged in resulted in three articles and my colleague and 
friend graduating with a poker related PhD thesis (Palomäki, Laakasuo & Salmela, 
2013a; 2013b; 2014). During this time we realized that there were still unanswered 
scientific questions related to our work, and these open questions now form the 
backbone of this thesis (Laakasuo, Palomäki & Salmela, 2014a; 2014b; 2015). With our 
initial work (Palomäki et al., 2013a; 2013b; 2014), we managed to shed light on the 
following things: 
We found out, using qualitative methodology, that the phenomenon known in 
the poker community as “tilting”(i.e. a state of mind associated with a series of bad 
decisions, loss of control and self-reported memory loss) seemed to be a variation of 
moral anger (i.e. feeling personally insulted and demanding retribution (in order) to feel 
that the world is fair) relevant to a poker playing context (Palomäki, Laakasuo & 
Salmela, 2013b). Based on our analysis, “tilting” appeared to be a common reaction for 
healthy poker players, who did not show any of the pathologies usually associated with 
gambling behaviors. 
Nevertheless, this moral anger response was triggered by one out of two types 
of events where the player either I) lost a lot of money in a single event or II) had a 
series of consecutive losses. Both of these triggers were associated with the perceived 
unfairness of the preceding situation(s). The perceptions of unfairness are warranted, to 
some extent, from a subjective perspective since poker does have an intrinsic 
mathematical skill component (see below, Uniqueness of Poker as a form of Gambling).
In many cases, the decisions to either fold (i.e. not to invest more money) or to call (i.e. 
to invest money) can be estimated to have approximate expected returns. However, due 
to the intrinsic chance element enmeshed into the very fibers of poker, the outcomes that
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are unlikely to occur, do occur from time to time. Therefore, a poker player who plays 
in tune with the harmony of probabilities might still end up losing large sums of money 
– even when odds are on his/her side. It is during these moments that “tilting” occurs, 
especially if the player perceives rare chance events as personal insults against what is 
perceived as “fair” or “just”.
Thus, tilting, was associated with an anger reaction. This in turn was related to 
chasing – trying to win back lost money – behaviors, where the poker player starts 
making increasingly worse decisions from a rational perspective. In the words of a 
participant of ours, the player tries to “restore the cosmic balance” of fairness by 
sacrificing his money on the Altar of Fortuna (i.e. the poker table). This sometimes 
results in cursing the other players or even breaking physical objects (see also 
McCormick & Griffiths, 2012). In our qualitative study experienced poker players also 
reported that tilting had stopped occurring for them and that they were not, supposedly, 
bothered by even large losses. 
From this point on, we started thinking that maybe some form of emotional 
maturity or emotional intelligence plays a role in developing efficient poker decision 
making skills. In our second study, we found evidence to support this (Palomäki et 
al.,2013a). The poker players who were more capable of self-reflection were also more 
likely to make mathematically correct decisions in hypothetical poker decision-making 
scenarios. These effects were moderated by skill and driven specifically by those poker 
players who were more experienced than average (as measured with our Poker 
Experience Scale). However, since this second study was both exploratory and 
correlational, we could not make causal inferences: do emotionally stable people 
become better poker players, or does the game of poker itself train people into “micro 
economic zen-masters”? 
We further aimed to clarify this question by running another survey which was 
a build-up on the findings of our two previous studies (Palomäki et al., 2014). In this 
third survey, we investigated whether such factors as self-perceived skill, actual skill 
and ability to withstand losses predispose people to – or even prevent them from –  
tilting. We found that experienced poker players reported more frequent and more 
severe tilting than inexperienced ones. However, the effects were mediated by 
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emotional sensitivity to losing. In other words, people who could not stand losing 
money tilted more. These findings were very interesting, since they suggested that 
experienced poker players, compared with inexperienced ones, were more “emotionally 
mature” and well-functioning, and at the same time, they reported more tilting. 
The apparent discrepancies in our previous studies suggested that there could be
genetic, non-pathological and situational components related to tilting. Furthermore, our
studies also suggested that tilting could be unrelated to pathological gambling. 
Especially our qualitative data showed that poker players seemed to be fairly well in 
control of their lives. More specifically, they seemed to be capable of remorse and self-
reflection after arduous losing streaks or after a series of bad decisions. In other words, 
our previous data show that our sample consisted mostly of rational and healthy adults 
and that the problematic issue of tilting was something that could more or less happen to
anybody. 
Given the details described above, three questions regarding tilting and 
emotional health in poker were raised. These are the research questions that form the 
basis of my thesis:
A) If tilting is something induced by the situation, can we simulate tilting or 
moral anger experimentally to observe its effects on poker decision making? The 
answer to this question is “yes”. We successfully created an online experiment where 
we observed angry poker players making worse decisions than neutral controls. This is 
the first study of this dissertation (Laakasuo et al., 2014a). – However at the time of 
writing we do not know if all the negative emotions would have a similar effect on 
decision making in poker.
B) Does acquiring poker experience make people better at emotion regulation, 
or do people who are naturally apt at such skills choose to persist with poker? The short 
answer is that there seems to be a statistically significant personality component 
involved (Laakasuo et al., 2014b). People who are naturally emotionally stable play 
more poker at higher stakes than people who are emotionally unstable. 
C) What is the relationship between pathological gambling, socio-emotional 
well-being and poker experience? The short answer seems to be that self-report 
measures of problematic/pathological gambling correlate well with poker experience 
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and with lowered emotional wellbeing. However, poker experience is either not 
associated, or in very weak positive association with socio-emotional wellbeing. The 
results of this third study suggest that the present instruments measuring problematic 
gambling are not well suited to be used in the context of poker (or possibly other games 
with significant skill components; Laakasuo et al., 2015).
1.2. Uniqueness of poker as a form of gambling
McCormack and Griffits (2012) characterize poker as a “game of inference and 
investment played with limited information”, where the player must “infer the strength 
of their own cards compared to their opponent’s cards based on the information they get
from their opponents wagers.” According to an emerging consensus in the field of 
gambling studies, poker is generally considered to be a game with a substantial skill 
component (Berg, 2010; Biolcati, Passini & Griffiths, 2014; DeDonno & Detterman, 
2008; Fiedler & Rock, 2009; for a dissenting view, see Meyer et al., 2013). This makes 
poker-playing a type of gambling with some unique properties as compared to other 
games of chance (e.g. roulette, craps, or lottery games). 
In poker, it is entirely possible for a gambler to be a winning player in the long 
run and to make substantial earnings (Hopley & Nicki, 2010). According to a classic 
paper by Browne (1989), skill in poker can be divided into technical and emotional 
components. The emotional skills in poker are related to self-regulation, wherein the 
player attempts actively to stay calm and not to lose his nerve, while his opponents are 
“needling” or harassing him verbally. The technical poker skills are related to 
understanding the mathematical dimensions of the game. These are usually related to 
estimating the relative strengths of different card combinations (i.e. hands) and to 
understanding the concept of statistical variance (see also Palomäki et al., 2013a; 
2013b; McCormack and Griffiths, 2012). Based on a short review (Cronson, Fishman &
Pope, 2008), argue that the skill component in poker is comparable to the skill 
component inherent in golf. 
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There is further evidence to suggest that the specific sub-category of online 
poker called No Limit Texas Hold'em has a unique sub-culture, where individual 
characteristics related to self-control and mathematical aptitude are explicitly 
appreciated (Biolcati et al, 2014; McCormack and Griffiths, 2012; albeit these 
properties are needed for other types of poker as well). Poker players who engage in 
online poker games also spend substantial time and effort in reading strategic poker 
playing guides and participate in extensive discussions in online forums that serve as a 
meeting point for the poker community (O'Leary and Carroll, 2013). This also makes 
poker a profoundly social game. Not only are poker players engaged in competitive 
situations against other players, but they are also steeped in their social identities as 
poker players within the larger society as well. Their failures and success are discussed 
in online forums and poker players worry about their reputations.
Social reality and the societal context outside of the gaming table also influence
the moods and feelings of poker players, who might be bringing these emotions into the 
gaming table, which in turn might influence their decisions. There is indeed some 
evidence that especially poker players who are classified as pathological gamblers 
might be engaging in poker to lift their moods, whereas the primary motivation for 
professional poker players is to earn money (McCormack and Griffitsh, 2012; Binde, 
2013). However, given that one of the major motivators behind gambling is escapism, it 
is very likely that bad mood predisposes some people to gamble. However, in poker it is
important to keep a clear mind, playing to escape is not something that can be easily 
combined with making money. In our qualitative study, we found evidence supporting 
these contentions (Palomäki et al., 2013b). Respondents with strong professional poker 
player identities portrayed a certain pride in being able to prevent the emotions 
generated by the game from interfering with their lives outside of the gaming arena 
(Palomäki et al., 2013b). 
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1.3. Dual process models, emotions, presence of others and 
expertise
1.3.1 Dual processing models
From the perspective of decision-making sciences, one would expect poker to attract 
more interest than it does in the present, as it seems to be an ideal environment to utilize
the dual processing models and (bounded) rational choice models. Poker is a technical 
game that requires careful rational, logical and mathematical aptitude as one needs to 
make decisions in limited time in a social setting and under emotional pressure. 
Dual process models are a family of models that aim to describe how decisions 
and judgments take place (Hassin, Uleman & Bargh, 2005; Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Most
commonly, it is assumed that there are two processing systems involved with human 
cognition, System 1 and System 2. System 1 is a automatic and fast-acting and mostly 
“unconscious”. What makes System 1 fast, is that it has been organized in to a network 
that processes several things at once. This parallel processing network also uses 
shortcuts and fast reflex-like reactions, or simplistic decision rules in its processing. 
These fast decisions rules are commonly known as heuristics (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2007). 
In common parlance heuristics are usually called “rules of thumb”, meaning 
that there are general principles for making decisions, which lead to good outcomes 
most of the time. For example, when I think of the biggest city in any country I usually 
get it right if I suggest that the capital of the country is the biggest. However, there are 
several countries where the capital is not the largest city (e.g., the biggest city in The 
United Stated is New York). In our everyday lives we also call heuristics intuitions and 
hunches. Depending on the dual processing model, it is sometimes assumed that System
1 is evolutionarily old. 
System 2, on the other hand, is postulated to be a serial processing system 
which works slowly. It is usually assumed that it is slow because it can only operate on 
very few things at any given moment. System 2 is also deliberate, calculative, logical 
and evolutionarily new or unique to humans. Very often System 2 is equated with 
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conscious or controlled decision-making. Depending on the dual processing model, 
System 2 is likely to be constrained by working memory capacity (Carruthers, 2006). In
humans, ecologically-rational decision making happens through the integration of both 
systems. When we are solving math puzzles or playing chess or writing computer 
programs, we are using System 2. Also, one could argue that the classical rational 
choice model of economics is based on System 2 type of processing (for a review see, 
Palomäki, Laakasuo & Lappi, 2012).  
The Rational Choice Model of economics assumes that people choose the 
option that is best for them (e.g., Briggs, 2014). Also, given that some decisions or 
choices can be expected to have a probabilistic outcome, the rational choice model 
assumes that people choose the option that has the highest expected pay-off (Briggs, 
2014). The standard or classical rational choice theory assumes that emotional processes
or irrational factors should not influence individuals' decisions, this makes the rational 
choice theory compatible with the dual processing theory, by subjugating classical 
rationality under the domain of System 2 (Palomäki, Laakasuo & Lappi, 2012). We used
this for our advantage and utilized the rational choice theory in creating our poker 
decision making scenarios, by estimating an expected return value for both fold and call
options in the scenarios (see Method section below for further elaboration).
Some dual processing theories (Carruthers, 2006) assume that System 1 has 
several context sensitive sub-systems or sub-components functioning within it. System 
1 could have automatic and heuristic processing systems for social cues and emotional 
cues separately. Depending on the context and the relevance of the information that is 
needed to make proper decisions, System 1 might feed different information to System 
2 on different occasions. If System 2 tries to parse several pieces of qualitatively 
different information together in complex situations where time and processing 
resources are limited, it is likely to perform sub-optimally. 
As an example regarding context sensitivity in economic decision making we 
could think of the following experiment ran by a team in Jyväskylä, Finland (Puurtinen 
& Mappes, 2009). They brought people into a lab in groups and they made them play a 
Public Goods Game, where participants put money into a collective pot, where the 
money is doubled and then redistributed back to the players. What they found was that 
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people who only played the game in their own group acted more or less selfishly and the
average investment into the common pot was low. However, when the participants were 
introduced to a competing group, whose decisions made no difference to them, the 
investment to the common pot suddenly shot up to a very high rate. Here the System 1 
feeds one form of information to to System 2 when there is no out group and another 
form of information when there is an out group. Although, the cost-benefit structure for 
the people in their own group stays exactly the same in both situations. The explanation 
for this effect is that the presence of competing out-groups makes the in-group structure 
salient and observable for the social brain/cognition.
Dual processing models have been used to predict human decision making in 
various settings. For instance, Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) found that if their 
participants were sexually aroused (activation of System 1), they were more likely to 
report willingness to have sex with siblings or with animals (overriding the norm-aware 
System 2), as compared to situations where they were not aroused. Sanfey et al., (2003) 
found that anger (emotional reaction at the level of System 1) motivated the rejection of 
unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game1. This is an irrational decision, since in the 
Ultimatum Game one either takes the money that is offered, or is left with nothing. 
Arguably, the anger reaction is an evolutionarily old mechanism intended to regulate 
resource-sharing in an equitable manner. Given that this reaction takes place when 
people play against other humans, but not against computers, it can be argued that anger
reaction is also sensitive to the social context. The function of anger is to make the 
transgressor change his/her behavior, so that it does not reoccur in the future. Computers
do not, yet, change their behaviors based on anger motivated human feedback. The 
prevalence of dual processing models is also noticeable in the rapidly growing field of 
moral psychology. As an example, it has been found (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, 
Nystrom & Cohen, 2008) that being under time pressure makes human moral judgment 
more deontological (emotional heuristic: “it is never permissible to kill”) and less 
utilitarian (calculation: “it is permissible to kill one, if it saves five”). 
System 1-level processing often leads to relatively acceptable and fast solutions 
1 Ultimatum game is a game where one player can split some number of money or candy between him-/herself and 
another player. The other player can then either accept or reject the offer. If the offer is rejected neither of the players 
gets to keep anything if the offer is accepted they both get to keep their share.
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to everyday problems in a reliable manner. However, intuitive solutions of System 1 
only have a limited applicability and the decision strategies it employs do not generalize
across domains. A classic example of this can be seen in certain logical puzzles labeled 
Wason Selection Tasks (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2005). Without going into technical 
details, there are two types of versions of these tasks. Some of the tasks are abstract, 
where the solution is based on numbers and letters, and some of the tasks are social, 
where the task deals with people and norms-violations. However, both versions of the 
tasks have the exact same logical/syntactic structures, i.e., they have the same solution. 
The abstract versions of the tasks are notoriously difficult to solve and only about 5–
15% of the people manage to solve it correctly. However, if the same logical puzzle is 
presented in a form where people need to figure out if someone has broken a social 
norm (i.e. “cheated”), about 90% of the respondents solve the task correctly. 
1.3.2 Audience effect and emotions in poker
Given the previous findings regarding the nature of poker, we concluded in our previous
studies that poker is emotionally engaging and evokes several negative feelings (fear, 
anger, self-loathing, anguish, anxiety, depression) as well as positive feelings (sense of 
accomplishment, joy, happiness). However, failing in emotional self-regulation very 
likely leads to detrimental decision making from the rational perspective, if emotional 
reactions can overwhelm rational and deliberate processing, as dual processing theories 
suggest. 
Moreover, in poker, the decisions are made under the watchful eyes of one's 
competitors, and players must have self-constraint to avoid giving away informative 
signals to them. This adds further constraints to the amount of mental resources that 
could otherwise be used for mathematical processing. There is a long-standing tradition 
in the field of social psychology, where the impact of real or imagined presence of 
others on socio-cognitive processes has been investigated. This is known as the 
audience effect and it has been linked to economic decisions regarding charity giving 
(Powell et al., 2012), paying for coffee voluntarily (Bateson et al., 2006) and punishing 
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those who defect in the Trust Game (Kurzban et al., 2007). Usually the audience effect 
has been triggered with static pictures of eyes or reminding people that there are 
cameras in the room watching them.
1.3.3 Development of expertise in poker
Automaticity research in the area of (social) cognitive decision-making also claims that 
the development of expertise occurs after a slow and effortful System 2-based training 
process. However, once mastered, the skill is “moved” into the domain of System 1 
(Dienes & Perner, 1999). Thereafter the individual has more System 2 level resources to
use for other mental operations. As an example, if a person wishes to learn how to ride a
bike, they first need to master the motor operations for keeping their balance, pedaling 
and steering. Once these skills are mastered, it is possible for the individual to start 
thinking about the traffic rules, and conduct their bicycle-riding according to these more
abstract rules. Once an individual has internalized the motor behaviors and the traffic 
rules, s/he can then automatically follow the traffic rules, while dedicating part of her 
cognition to a pod-cast coming from her mp3 player. All these, while driving in a 
traffic-rich city environment. This is an important analogy with respect to poker 
decision making (see also Tendler, 2011). 
Since poker players engage in millions of decisions and possibly use thousands 
of hours to train themselves in their craft, we argue that their level of skill needs to be 
taken into consideration in the analysis of the data. For this reason, we included a 
measure assessing the level of individual's poker skill in Study 1 (see below). We 
assume that the level of poker expertise is relevant for all the studies presented in this 
thesis. Presumably, an expert poker player is capable of concentrating on different 
aspects of the game as compared to a novice and thus more likely to be able to make 
better decisions under cognitive load.
This links our studies with the field expertise studies. Study of expertise, as an 
academic field, is relatively limited in comparison to many other fields on inquiry. 
Large portions of the work have been done during 1980s and since 1990s the field has 
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become less active (see Farrington-Darby & Wilson, 2006, for a review). What is 
surprising is that this area of research, for large parts, have been conducted with 
qualitative methods and in the fields that neighbor sociology. Nonetheless, the work in 
this area has been reviewed extensively (see also Baker & Horton, 2004 and McDaniel, 
Martin & Maines, 2002), and at least three different definitions are presently available. 
Here we will only concentrate on the cognitive analysis of expertise. According 
to Farrington-Darby and Wilson (2005, who refer to Glaser and Chi, 1988). Cognitive 
expertise builds up from the following parts: experts are better at perceiving patterns in 
their domain. They are also faster than novices and they produce less errors and analyze 
the problems at a more deeper level. Furthermore, experts use more time analyzing their
problems qualitatively and they have better self-monitoring skills than novices. This 
seems to nicely agree with our previous results (see especially Palomäki et al., 2013b), 
where we have observed that best decisions are made by those experienced poker 
players who have higher self-reflection capabilities and in their accurate perceptions 
regarding “luck” or chance in poker.
However, Farrington-Darby and Wilson (2006) also report that decision-making
research has shown that experts do not necessarily out-perform novices and that they do 
often score poorly on coherence, reliability and accuracy. Gigerenzer (2007) has also 
recently reviewed economic decision making literature in the area of stock market 
investment. He concluded that expert investors do not fare any better than list of 
randomly produced company names.  This then seems to be at odds with the results that 
we have obtained (see Palomäki et al., 2013b and Laakasuo et al., 2014a). 
This seeming discrepancy between the previous literature and our results could 
be an artifact of different study designs. In our study we use big samples (N > 350) and 
we use quantitative methods and controlled decision making scenarios where we have 
mathematically calculated the correct decision that the participant should make. In 
contrast, almost all the studies that Farrington-Darby & Wilson (2006) report are more 
or less small data sets consisting of qualitative data. Indeed Farrington-Darby &Wilson 
(2006) conclude the following in their review:  "We have suggested  […] that a source 
of the apparent confusion and conflicting findings […] on expertise arises from the 
variety of […] disciplines and perspectives, and of the many domains in which it is 
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studied, and the impact these factors have on methodological choice.”
Thus, not only is poker a suitable new tool for decision making researchers, it 
also has the potential to increase our knowledge regarding the development of expertise 
in individuals. We therefore think that poker is a valuable addition to the field of 
expertise studies as well. 
1.4 Models of personality and problem gambling in poker-
research
1.4.1 What is personality?
Personality is a constellation of individual behavioral tendencies or traits, which are 
considered to be relatively stable once the individual reaches the age of 30 (McRae & 
Costa, 2005; Rutter, 2006). According to modern personality theories, there are five or 
six major dimensions along which personality is expressed in humans. These traits are 
reliably normally distributed and are able to predict about 9% of behavioral variance, 
from moving patterns to consumer choices to mate selection. Personality is also 
considered to be relatively highly heritable, and therefore it probably has a significant 
biological basis (either genetic or epigenetic or both). Measuring personality traits and 
analyzing their correlates gives us a strong theoretically founded  reasons to suggest 
possible directions for causality that go from genes to behaviors.
At the moment, there is an on-going scientific conversation about the exact 
number of personality traits and about whether these traits can be reduced to smaller 
number of dimensions. The evidence is mixed, but according to a recent analysis by De 
Vries (2011), there is no basis for trying to reduce the number below six (the HEXACO 
model, see 1.4.3. below). 
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1.4.2 Psychopathology and Personality factors in Poker Players 
In our previous research (Palomäki et al., 2013b; 2013b), we developed and validated an
instrument called the Poker Experience Scale (PES). Since then, this scale has been 
used in three decision-making studies (see Palomäki et al 2012a; Palomäki et al.,, in 
preparation, Study 1 of this thesis) and it reliably predicts mathematically accurate 
decisions in fictional poker decision-making scenarios. The more experienced the poker 
player is, the more likely he is to choose the mathematically correct decisions in 
situations where the expected values of folding and calling have been calculated. 
Furthermore, accumulated experience in poker (as measured by PES) has been linked to
self-reported capability to control the negative emotions caused by monetary gaming 
losses. 
These findings shed light on aspects of gambling behavior that have been 
overlooked in previous research, which has mostly concentrated on the pathological 
aspects of gambling and online gaming. For instance, extensive gambling has been 
associated with distorted cognitions, substance abuse (Ramirez, McCormick, Russo & 
Tabler, 1983), social anomie (Trevorrow & Moore, 1998), depression (Becona, Lorenzo 
& Fuentes, 1996), schizophrenia (Potenza & Chambers, 2001), economic problems, 
impaired impulse control (Blaszczynski, Steel & McConaghy, 1997), anti-social 
personality disorders and psychopathy (Blaszczynski, McConaghy & Frankova, 1989; 
Slutske et al., 2001). However, due to poker being a unique form of gambling, it is not 
straightforward to generalize results obtained from one form of (pathological) gambling 
context to another. More specifically, behavioral markers associated with psycho-
pathologies in games of chance are not necessarily indicators of psycho-pathology in the
context of games of skill, like poker (Dickerson, 1993).
The above listing of forms of psychopathology associated with gambling is 
noteworthy. Especially of interest in the context of poker is the possible link between 
gambling and anti-social personality disorder, or psychopathy. Poker is inherently a 
competitive zero-sum game, where one person's loss is another's gain. It could be 
possible that poker attracts social predators and those who wish to exploit others. 
However, this is as likely as finding psychopaths in any form of competitive skill based 
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sports. Also of interest in the above listing is the association of social anomie or 
alienation with gambling, since lately Griffiths et al., (2010) have suggested that 
internet has given rise to a new form of problem gambling where people do not lose 
money, but time. This suggests that if internet poker players can be classified in the 
same category of problem gamblers as those who mainly engage in games of pure 
chance, poker players could be low in agreeableness and extroversion and have severe 
psychopathological problems as well. However, this does not seem to be the case (see 
Study 3).
The profile of a recreational poker player which comes out of recent scientific 
evidence is that of a young male who reports drinking problems and who scores higher 
on problem gambling indices than their non-poker-gambling controls (Shead, Hodgkins 
& Schear, 2008; Hopley & Nicki, 2010). Poker players are reported to spend more time 
and money per month on gambling than their peers who do not play poker (Shead, 
Hodgkins & Schear, 2008). Other results also suggest that poker players are alexithymic
(Mitrovic & Brown, 2009), have lower levels of impulse control (Hopley & Nicki, 
2010), and are more prone to magical thinking than the population average (Dufour, 
Brunelle & Roy, 2013). 
However, since the majority of poker players are healthy normal people, 
extensive focusing on psychopathology overshadows other interesting phenomena. In 
many ways poker is a naturalistic and a controlled micro-economic decision-making 
environment. What also makes poker a relatively naturalistic in its set-up, is that it is 
competitive and involves uncertainty in betting outcomes. Poker would thus offer a rich 
environment in which to study decision-making, probability estimation, risk taking, 
cognitive load, emotional processes and so on. However, since poker is an emotional 
game of skill and chance where clinical instruments seem ill suited for detecting 
pathology, drawing conclusions regarding the deeper personality profiles and possible 
psycho-pathological tendencies of healthy poker-players might not be warranted. 
Healthy emotional reactions could also be confounded with behaviors that would 
normally be classified as pathological reactions in other circumstances – persistent 
focus on pathology would not detect this. 
In a recent study by Berg (2010), it was concluded that poker is a unique form 
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of gambling, since it is a social game of skill that also has a chance component. 
Therefore, the multifaceted nature of poker is probably attractive to a variety of people 
for a variety of reasons. Indeed, in a recent latent component analysis Dafour, Brunelle 
& Roy (2013) conclude that there are at least three classes of poker players: recreational
players, internet players and multiform players. These different types of players have 
differing motivations and cognitions for engaging in poker, differing gaming strategies 
or even substance use habits.
More specifically, internet poker players had more pronounced forms of 
magical belief (illusion of control) than other types of poker players, but they showed 
less pathological symptoms of alcohol or other substance abuse (Dafour, Brunelle & 
Roy, 2013). In addition, internet players were more likely to report that they were 
making a living through their gambling and less likely to be depressed or suffer from 
anxiety disorders as compared to the other two classes. At the same time, they were also
more likely to spend money on gambling compared to the other two groups.
It is possible that the illusion of control in poker players can be attributed to the 
detail in which they perceive poker as a game of skill and therefore feel they can 
influence the outcome of the game with a skillful play. Dafour et al., (2013) argue that 
the instrument used for profiling poker players (Problem Gambling Screening 
Instrument, PGSI) is too sensitive. One of the central themes of Study 3 (see 1.6) was 
indeed to critically evaluate some of the tools used in clinical psychology to diagnose 
pathological gambling. The instruments that are most commonly used (PGSI and 
SOGS) have been mostly developed before the widespread use of internet. Hence, they 
are probably not very well suited for the internet poker context, where skill and the fact 
that for professional poker players “repetitive behavior” of gaming is comparable to 
having a day job. Future problem gambling screening instruments could be improved by
taking these notions into consideration when the questionnaire items are formulated. 
Notwithstanding, the internet players described by Darfour et al., (2013) seem 
to be similar to the casino/internet players described by Shead et al., (2008) or the 
professional players described by Bjerg (2010) and by McCormack and Griffiths 
(2012). These players give special attention to not playing while they are under the 
influence of cannabis or alcohol, take pride in emotional self-control and in keeping 
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their budget tight with respect to potential losses. Internet players, or experienced 
professional and semi-professional players also seem to be motivated in becoming more
skilled at something which they consider to be their work, whereas other types of poker 
players do not. This also is in line with our previous studies (Palomäki et al 2013a; 
2013b), where we found that experienced poker players are more self-reflective and 
more mature with respect to their emotional experiences as compared to less 
experienced players. 
In summary, if these profiles are translated into the language of personality 
theories (Big-5 or HEXACO, see 1.4.3. below), a non-professional poker player is most 
likely going to be a person low in Agreeableness, high in Extroversion, low in Honesty-
humility, and low on Conscientiousness, since he is seeking for excitement and is not in 
control of himself. On the other hand, an experienced poker player is most likely an 
introvert (i.e. has low levels of extroversion), with relatively high levels of 
Conscientiousness, since he does not crave the social stimuli of the live games and is 
meticulous about controlling himself. Nonetheless, as far as we are aware with respect 
to personality, there has not been any extensive report or analysis available reporting the
FFM or HEXACO personality profiles of healthy internet poker players. However, there
is a previous study trying to separate between poker playing styles and FFM personality
profiles of poker players, but without finding any statistically significant differences 
among the gaming styles (Brown & Mitchell, 2009). Also, if emotional intelligence is to
be considered as part of the personality constellation, then we would also expect poker 
players to be low in emotional intelligence, since some researchers have suggested that 
alexithymia is a associated with poker and gambling more generally (Mitrovic & 
Brown, 2009). However, Mitrovic and Brown (2009) do note that comorbidity of 
alexithymia and pathological poker gambling is likely to be mediated by the fact that 
pathological poker gamblers might be pathological gamblers in general. They just 
happen to play poker, too.
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1.4.3 HEXACO personality inventory
HEXACO is similar to BIG-5 or Five-Factor-Model (FFM), in that it incorporates the 
same five personality dimensions found in them. These five or six factors of personality 
are generally considered to be irreducible and the most parsimonious way of measuring 
personality. In addition, these instruments are considered to incorporate the richness of 
the texture used to describe the concept of personality (e.g., DeVries, 2011). 
Both HEXACO and FFM show high levels of test-retest validity along with 
high internal consistencies (Ashton, 2013, McRae & Costa, 2005). Furthermore, they 
show high levels of convergent and divergent validity with other related individual 
differences measures and they have both been extensively validated within the last 30 
years, also cross-culturally (e.g., McRae & Costa, 2005 and Ashton, 2013).
The classical FFM consists of the following five factors: Extroversion, 
Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Openness to experience. The 
biggest difference between HEXACO and FFM is the H-factor, which stands for 
Honesty-Humility. Other less significant differences between FFM and HEXACO relate
to how the sub-facets load on the main constructs. It has been argued that Honesty-
Humility is often confounded within the five usual dimensions of FFM (Ashton & Lee, 
2004; Lee & Ashton, 2007). According to these arguments, once Honesty-Humility is 
extracted or factored out of the data, it changes the contents of the other dimensions as 
well. Below, I present a summary of the differences between HEXACO and FFM 
(Ashton et al., 2004; Ashton & Lee, 2004; Lee & Ashton, 2007). The differences among
the sub-facets are summarized, commented and presented in Table 1. The concepts used 
to describe the HEXACO dimensions below, are not directly observable from the names
of the sub-facets listed in Table 1.
Extroversion in HEXACO is a measure of sociability and talkativeness, but it 
does not incorporate the concepts of bravery, toughness and independence, as is the case
in some FFM models. In HEXACO, these sub-components seem to load more on 
Emotional stability (Neuroticism in FFM). HEXACO Agreeableness, which is a trait 
measure of gentleness, patience and tolerance is very similar to the FFM Agreeableness,
but the two have some subtle differences. For instance, the Agreeableness sub-factor 
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labeled as Generosity loads under Honesty-Humility in the HEXACO model. 
Furthermore, irritability, which is usually found in Emotionality (Neuroticism), is found 
under Agreeableness in HEXACO. 
Furthermore, HEXACO Conscientiousness is very similar to the FFM 
variations thereof. Conscientiousness is a measure of orderliness, punctuality and 
industriousness. Within HEXACO, the moral conscience sub-factor of 
Conscientiousness loads under Honesty-Humility. The Emotionality factor of 
HEXACO, as already stated, does not include the facet of irritability but includes some 
of the resilience sub-components that are not found within FFM Neuroticism. 
HEXACO Emotionality is mostly a measure of fearfulness, anxiousness and 
sentimentality, where according to Ashton et al., (2004, pp. 361), “the 'unemotional' 
pole [of this factor] emphasizes fearlessness, self-assurance, and toughness rather than 
the even temper that is traditionally included within an Emotional Stability factor”. 
Openness to experience in HEXACO is linked to concepts such as unconventionality, 
imaginativeness and intellectuality, appreciation of aesthetics and philosophy. 
HEXACO, unlike FFM strives to separate Openness from General intelligence (IQ) and 
from intellectual performance (Ashton, 2013). 
The most defining feature of HEXACO is the H-factor (Honesty-Humility). 
This factor is associated with such features as low greed and high levels of integrity and 
helpfulness. Honesty-Humility correlates negatively with Machiavellian attitudes, lavish
lifestyle choices and status striving (Lee & Ashton, 2004 ). People with low scores are 
prone to lie, flatter and break the rules to get what they want. People who have high 
levels of honesty-humility are also reliable and accountable and take responsibility for 
their actions and do not enjoy manipulating others. In Big-5, the helpfulness sub-facet is
loaded under Agreeableness. Recently, a Dutch research team also noted that Honesty-
Humility is important in explaining Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity (see de Vries, de 
Vries & Feij, 2009). 
We chose HEXACO over the FFM model since, a) HEXACO rotation of the 
data is based on real factor analysis, where as FFM is based on principal components 
analysis and seems to have some issues with replication (Lee & Ashton, 2012), b) 
HEXACO nonetheless gives the same information theoretically as the FFM and finally 
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c) it has an added dimension which adds novelty value to our studies.
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Table 1. Summarizing some of the differences between HEXACO and FFM (IPIP NEO PI-R)
FFM (IPIP NEO PI-R) HEXACO
Sub-facets Notes Sub-facets Notes
Honesty-Humility
N/A N/A
Sincerity
Fairness
Greed avoidance
Modesty
FFM : Neuroticism 
HEXACO : Emotionality
Anxiety
Hostility
Depression
Self-consciousness
Impulsiveness
Vulnerability to stress
Concept of irritability in FFM is associated 
with high levels of Neuroticism. In HEXACO, 
it is associated with low levels of 
Agreeableness.
Fearfulness
Anxiety
Dependence
Sentimentality
Concepts like Bravery, Toughness and Independence are 
associated with low levels of Emotionality under 
HEXACO, but with high levels of Extroversion in FFM
Extroversion Warmth
Gregariousness
Assertiveness
Activity
Excitement Seeking
Positive Emotion
Bravery, Toughness and Independence in FFM 
are concepts associated with high levels of 
Extroversion. In HEXACO, these are 
associated with low Emotionality.
Expressiveness
Social Boldness
Sociability
Liveliness
Agreeableness Trust
Straightforwardness
Altruism
Complience
Modesty
Tendermindedness
Modesty and Tendermindedness are similar to 
HEXACO Modesty and Sincerity. The concept
of generosity in FFM is associated with high 
levels of Agreeableness. In HEXACO it is 
associated with Honesty-Humility.
Forgiveness
Gentleness
Flexibility
Patience
Patience is not found in NEO PI-R
Conscientiousness Competence
Order
Dutifulness
Achievement Striving
Self-Discipline
Deliberation
Organizational
Diligence
Perfectionism
Prudence
Openness to Experience Fantasy
Aesthetics
Feelings
Actions
Ideas 
Values
Some items of “Values” sub-component might 
correlate with IQ (e.g. preference for puzzles )
Aesthetic Appreciation
Inquisitiveness
Creativity
Unconventionality
1.5. Aims of the thesis
The primary aim of the present thesis was to shed more light on those emotional 
processes that are related to poker and which are associated with bad decisions (as 
assessed from a mathematical perspective).
 These components include personality, emotional health, situational and 
psycho-pathological factors. Study 1 concentrated on situational factors (e.g. being 
angry and/or being exposed to a social setting). Study 2 aimed to see whether 
personality factors act as predictors of expertise (i.e. whether certain types of traits are 
more associated with individual tendencies to persist playing online poker). In Study 3 
we aimed to assess the whether the most common problem gambling screening 
instruments were applicable in online poker. PGSI and SOGS are commonly used in the
area of gambling studies to categorizes the study participants into  pathological and non-
pathological, based on their gambling habits. In Study 3 we aimed to assess whether this
approach is valid in a sample of poker players 
Study 1
Study 1 was a true experiment, that is, an experiment where participants are randomized
into control and experimental groups. Its specific aims included the following:
i) to substantiate and validate previous qualitative findings by Palomäki et al., (2014), 
according to which anger or moral anger, specifically in the social context, would hinder
the mathematical accuracy of our participants in poker decision making,
ii) to replicate the previous findings presented in Palomäki et al., (2013a), namely that 
more experienced poker players are more likely to make correct decisions in poker from
a mathematical point of view, 
iii) to separate between the social, emotional and skill factors that might contribute to 
the performance of the participants in their decision making situations.
For our experiment, we had the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Feeling anger reduces the mathematical accuracy of players' 
poker decision making, and this effect is strengthened by feeling/experiencing a social 
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presence.
Hypothesis 2: Experienced poker players make mathematically more accurate 
poker decisions, as compared with inexperienced players. 
These aims and hypotheses were selected for the following reasons:
1) We wanted to evaluate whether healthy people would tilt under specific situations, as 
suggested by our previous findings.
2) We wanted to evaluate whether it is just the emotional or the social aspect of poker 
(or both in combination) that is the principal factor motivating tilting.
3) Our previous qualitative analysis alone is not sufficient for making conclusions about
emotional processes or the possible pathological aspects of gambling. We aimed to gain 
further support for our previous findings.
Study 2
Study 2 was inspired by our previous findings (Palomäki et al., 2012a; 2012b; 2013), 
which showed that poker might function as a training ground for emotional maturity. It 
therefore had the following aims:
i) to measure the HEXACO personality structure of the poker playing population, which
to our knowledge has not been done previously.
ii) to correlate the HEXACO Emotionality dimension (which corresponds to the BIG-5 
Neuroticism dimension) with poker experience scale (PES). Furthermore, we 
investigated how individual items of PES correlated with emotionality. 
iii) to assess whether there are differences in preferences between online and live poker 
gaming for different personality dimensions.
For assessing the personality structure of internet poker players we had the 
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Emotionally stable poker players are more likely to have 
accumulated higher levels of poker experience 
Hypothesis 2: Extroversion is positively associated with a preference for live 
poker play.
The aims and hypotheses were selected for the following reasons:
1) Since it is assumed, on theoretical basis, that personality is based on the genome of 
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the individual, it is also assumed that it is relatively stable throughout individuals life 
(see 1.4. above). Therefore, we conducted this study to gain more information regarding
how poker playing skills are developed and whether they might influence the emotional 
maturity of any given individual. More specifically we wanted to check if HEXACO 
Emotionality correlates with poker experience. If, for instance, there is a negative 
correlation, this could be an indication that there is a self-selection mechanism involved 
(i.e. the individuals who can withstand the pressures of the poker playing environment, 
become more experienced in poker than those who cannot). 
2) We wanted to investigate the differences between those who prefer to play poker in 
live settings as compared to those who prefer on-line environments, which has not been 
measured with HEXACO previously, as far as we are aware. This point has clinical 
relevance as well, since it could very well be that on-line poker attracts individuals with 
different psychopathological risk profiles as compared to those who prefer live poker. It 
could also be that individuals with different personality profiles make poker decisions 
differently, or prefer certain strategies rather than others. 
Study 3
Study 3 consisted of three smaller studies, which all aimed to investigate the 
relationship between emotional adjustment, emotional well-being, selfishness and 
accumulated poker experience. 
The aims of the first sub-study (Study 3.1) were twofold.
i) To have an initial overview with respect to problem gambling, poker experience and 
emotional well-being. Our perspective was at the level of general life satisfaction and 
general emotion regulation abilities, on measures that chart psychological wellbeing. In 
study 3.3. We investigated sociological wellbeing. Our general purpose in Studies 3.1 – 
3.3 was to asses wellbeing indicators of healthy people as widely as possible.
ii) To confirm the construct validity of the modified problem gambling scales we 
employed.
For the first sub-study we had the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Problematic gambling would correlate positively with detrimental 
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emotion regulation 
Hypothesis 2: Problematic gambling would correlate positively with poker playing 
experience. 
Hypothesis 3: Poker playing experience would correlate positively with measures of 
well-being and emotional intelligence.
These aims and hypotheses were chosen since we wanted to investigate the 
validity of the implicit background assumptions prevalent in the field of gambling 
studies, that regular gambling is pathological and thus detrimental for wellbeing.
 
The aim of the second sub-study (Study 3.2) was:
i)To investigate whether poker experience would be associated with more selfish, 
competitive or exploiting behaviors of others. This issue was raised since gambling 
disorders have been associated with anti-social personality disorders and poker is a 
competitive zero-sum-game, where gains for one mean losses for the other. It could 
therefore be argued that poker predisposes players to adopt dehumanizing views of 
other people more generally. 
For the second sub-study we had the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: there would be no link between poker experience and 
selfish/competitive behaviors, but that there could be a link between selfish behaviors 
and pathological gambling tendencies. 
We chose this hypothesis and aim because:
1) We wanted to see if the general pattern observed in the previously conducted study 
would be replicated with another gambling measure
2) We wanted to see if the decision-making habits of poker portray the same pattern as 
the wellbeing measures. Social Value Orientation scale is basically a game-theoretical 
measure.
The aims of the third sub-study were (Study 3.3):
i) to assess the associations between poker experience and social well-being and 
adjustment to the general values of the society. This issue has been raised by Griffiths et
al., (2010), who argued that poker players might be losing time and social opportunities 
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since playing poker often entails long marathon sessions, where players are seemingly 
isolated from social interaction, possibly leading to alienation and anomie.
ii) to assess whether the implications of our qualitative study could be substantiated. 
One of the themes that rose from our previous study based on qualitative data suggested
that poker might function as a training ground for developing self-control. We wanted to
investigate this notion with quantitative tools and instruments in order to check its 
accuracy.
The hypotheses for the third sub-study were:
 Hypothesis 1: no association should be found between poker experience and social 
anomie or alienation, 
Hypothesis 2: a negative association should exist between anomie/alienation with 
respect to self-control, social wellbeing and emotional intelligence measures 
Hypothesis 3: positive associations should be observed between measures or social 
wellbeing, self-control and emotional intelligence.
We chose thess aims and hypothesis for Study 3.3 since:
1) we wanted to investigate the sociological level of well-being, to supplement the 
measures of psychological well-being mentioned in Study 3.1.
2) we wanted to include another set of emotional intelligence scales in our analysis to 
replicate the previous zero correlations of another emotional intelligence measure 
(presented in Study 3.1)
To sum up, the general aim of Study 3 was to elucidate and clarify whether the 
implicit stereotypes about poker players in the field of gambling studies are accurate.
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2. METHODS
2.1. Study designs and participants
Study 1 was a true experiment (i.e., participants were randomized into conditions and 
the experimenter was blind for the randomization), while all other studies were 
correlational. All data were gathered via the Internet. The data for Studies 1, 2 and 3.1 
were collected simultaneously as a part of a single larger on-line 
experiment/questionnaire prepared with Qualtrics in English. This questionnaire was 
completed by 478 individuals (36 females; Mean Age = 29.9, SD = 9.35, range = 17–
77). Participants had the option of participating in a draw of four separate $50 gift 
coupons for Amazon.com.
For Study 1, we included only participants with one year or more of poker 
playing experience, since detailed understanding of poker was a requirement for the 
dependent variable tasks. The final sample size for Study 1 was 459 (33 females). The 
experiment had a 2 (emotional prime: anger vs. neutral) × 2 (social presence: eyes on 
the screen vs. black box on the screen) factorial design. The participants were 
automatically randomized into the experimental conditions. For Studies 2 and 3.1, the 
whole sample was included in the analyses. The sample size was decided a priori to be 
above 400, since this is classically considered to be a “big” sample in social statistics. 
We preferably wanted around 120 participants per cell (total of 480), since we were 
expecting a small effect sizes and we knew we would need to control for the level of 
poker experience of the individuals who would participate in our study. Furthermore, 
since our social presence manipulation randomly picked either female or male eyes, we 
needed to secure enough participants in each counterbalanced cell (see 2.2. further 
below).
The data for Studies 3.2 and 3.3 were collected in conjunction with another set 
of studies unrelated to the aims of the current ones (see Palomäki et al., 2014; 2013a). 
The variables (scale items) presented here were situated at the beginning of the 
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questionnaire to avoid extensive priming effects or other contaminating factors. The 
sample size for Study 3.2 was 417 (31 females; Mean age: 27.9, SD = 7.45, range: 16–  
66). The sample size for Study 3.3 was 354 (Mean age: 28.4, SD = 7.7, range: 17–62). 
Studies 3.2 and 3.3 were conducted in Finnish. For a summary of descriptions of 
samples and study designs, see Table 2. 
There is probably some overlap between the samples listed in Table 2, since the 
method of data collection was similar in all studies. This could not be ethically avoided 
with the technology we had at our disposal without jeopardizing participant anonymity.
Table 2: Overview of the collected samples
Study N (women) Age (SD) Number of Scales /
 Focus
Design of the
study
Sample 1
1 
2 
3.1
459 (33)*
478 (36)
478 (36)
29.9 (9.35)
2: DV + PES4 /
Em. of Anger and
Audience Effect
7: HEXACO+PES4 /
Personality
7: Wellbeing scales +
PES3
Emotional Wellbeing
2×2 Experiment
Correlational
Correlational
Sample 2 3.2 417 (31) 27.9 (7.45) 3: SVO+SOGS+PES3
Selfishness
Correlational
Sample 3 3.3 354 (23) 28.4 (7.7) 6: Wellbeing scales +
PES4
Social wellbeing
Correlational
* We excluded participants with less than one year of poker playing experience
In all studies, the participants were recruited through the social media and 
online poker forums. During the data collection for Studies 3.2 and 3.3 we also actively 
utilized the e-mail lists of Finnish university student associations. All studies were 
conducted by complying to the Finnish law regarding research ethics for social sciences.
All participants were provided with informed consent forms and a debriefing. 
Participant anonymity was guaranteed and all identifying information was removed 
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from the data. Estimating whether the sample is representative of the poker playing 
population in general is challenging, since no normative sample has ever been collected 
to which we could compare our collected samples and make these judgments.
No pilot experiments were run, since the concept of the poker decision tasks 
had already been tested previously by Palomäki et al., (2013a). In these studies we 
noticed that experienced poker players with high self-reflection capacities were more 
likely to solve these tasks correctly (as compared to non-experienced and/or low self-
reflecting individuals).
2.2 Procedures and Materials
Data for Studies 1, 2 and 3.1 were collected with a single online questionnaire. 
Participants first filled in the HEXACO personality measures (Study 2), after which 
they continued to fill in measures on wellbeing, emotional intelligence and rumination 
(Study 3.1, see Table 3). Finally, the participants filled in the Poker Experience Scale 
(see below) and were randomized into one of the two experimental conditions: anger or 
neutral prime. Studies 3.2 and 3.3 were correlational questionnaire studies without any 
experimental manipulations.
2.2.1 Procedures and Materials for Study 1
After filling in variables related to the other studies (2 and 3.1, see Tables 2 and 3) 
participants were randomized into one of the two experimental conditions. In the neutral
condition, participants read a vignette in which an individual spends an ordinary 
evening with his/her partner. In both conditions the participants read a short story where
they were told to take the position of the narrator. In the anger condition, participants 
read a short anger-eliciting vignette where the narrator finds his/her partner engaging in 
flagrante delicto — sexual infidelity — with their best friend. The stories have been 
previously validated as successful primes of aggression and non-aggression (Denzler et 
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al., 2009). We modified them slightly for the current purposes. The stories were adapted 
for both genders, and participant gender was taken into account when the stories were 
presented. After reading the stories the participants filled in the manipulation checks.
According to our manipulation check, participants randomized into the anger 
prime condition reported feeling significantly worse than participants randomized into 
the neutral prime condition (7-point bipolar scale item: “How negative or positive is the 
feeling evoked by the story” Mneutral: 1.99 (SD = 1.26)  vs. Manger: -1.86 (SD = 1.19); 
t(456) = 33.64, p.<.001. According to Denzler et al.,(2009), the priming effects should 
last for “some minutes” and they state that similar primes are effective to about 4–5 
minutes. This was more than enough for for participants to fill in our poker decision 
making tasks (which were presented in random order).
Immediately after reading the story, participants completed five fictitious poker 
decision-making tasks. The tasks were presented in textual format (see Poker Decision 
Making Tasks in APPENDIX 1). Before participants saw the decision making scenarios,
they were randomized again into one out of two experimental conditions. In the identity 
salience condition condition, a pair of moving human eyes was presented during the 
decision making tasks. The eyes were computer-animated from black and white 
photographs and located above the textual description of the task. The gaze of the eyes 
followed the mouse cursor. Participants were randomly presented with either female or 
male eyes. In the control condition, a black box was presented. The black box reacted to
the mouse movements by tilting either to left or right, depending on the location of the 
mouse cursor. The dimensions and the location of the control prime matched that of the 
identity salience condition). The eyes and the box were coded with JavaScript and were 
embedded into the Qualtrics questionnaire. Experimenters were blind to the 
randomization process. A demonstration of the moving eyes manipulation can be seen 
at: http://kaktus.cc/michael/ (see Figure 1 for a screen shot) Finally, participants filled in
their demographics and were debriefed. 
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Figure 1. Screen shot from a decision making task similar to the one used in Study1.
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2.2.2 Descriptions of scales
2.2.2.1. Dependent variable of Study 1
Based on rational choice theory, we constructed five poker decision making tasks where
participants were facing a decision to either fold or call, in a hypothetical game 
situation. We postulated that this way of consturcting the tasks would engage the 
System 2 -type processing suggested by the dual processing theory (see further below).
The tasks involved a common poker variant called, No Limit Texas Hold'em 
(NLHE). In each task, the game was heads-up (i.e., one versus one), and either folding 
(i.e., ”not investing”) or calling (i.e., matching the bet made by the 
opponent/”investing”) was designed to be the mathematically correct solution, based on 
the expected value of the decision (coded “1 = mathematically correct decision”, “0 = 
mathematically incorrect decision”). For each respondent, the number of correct choices
was summed and then averaged, resulting in a “decision score” (minimum score = 0 
points, maximum score = 1 point).
Every decision task was presented in a similar setting (see Figure 1). 
Participants were told, in writing, what NLHE starting hand they had (e.g., 7 of hearts, 
and 6 of clubs). They were also told which community cards were on the table (e.g., 
Queen of spades, 8 of hearts, 5 of diamonds). They were also told i) the amount of 
money they had at the beginning of the current round and ii) the amount of money that 
was currently in the pot (total of what had been played so far), and iii) the amount of 
money they had currently. 
After this, the respondents were described what their opponent did (e.g., “The 
opponent bets all-in”). As a last piece of information the participants were given 
specifics that were related to the situation (e.g., “You know for a fact that your opponent
can have anything. In other words, you know for a fact that your opponent's range of 
possible hands is any two cards”). This information enables a mathematical calculation 
of equity for both calling and folding. Therefore, either folding or calling was always 
the mathematically correct choice. See the Appendix 1 for a full technical description of
expected value evaluations for the tasks.
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2.2.2.2 Poker Experience Scale in Studies 1 – 3 
A listing of all the variables that were used in the studies can be found from Table 3, 
along with all the relevant statistics. In the published versions of Studies 1, 3.1, 3.2 and 
3.3, we used the original three-item version of our previously validated Poker 
Experience Scale (see Palomäki et al.,2013a; 2013b). This scale consists of the 
following 10-point Likert items: ”How many years have you played poker?” (1 = ”Less 
than 1”; 10 = ”More than 15” ); ”At what level of stakes do you usually play?” (1 = 
”Freerolls, NL2–5, PLO2-5, SNG1–5, MTT1–5 ”; 10 = ”Above NL600, PLO600, 
SNG500, MTT500”) and ”What is the rough estimate of how many poker hands you 
have played during your life?” (1 = ”0–50 000”; 10 = ”more than 5 million”). See Table 
3 for descriptives.
In Study 2, we used an extended 4-item version of the scale, which has 
subsequently been used succesfully in another study (see Palomäki et al.,in preparation).
This additional item, which was also used in reanalysis of Study 1 and analysis of Study
2, is: ‘‘Do you consider yourself to be a professional poker player?’’ This question was 
anchored from 1 = ‘‘definitely not a [full time] professional poker player’’ to 10 = 
‘‘definitely a [full time] professional poker player’. Higher scores indicate higher poker 
experience. The complete coding and related abbreviations mentioned above are 
presented in Palomäki et al.,(2013a).
2.2.2.3 Scales of Study 2
In Study 2, we used the English version of HEXACO-PI-R (HEXACO-60; Ashton & 
Lee, 2009) to assess personality. HEXACO is a six dimensional instrument with very 
good psychometric properties (Lee & Ashton, 2004; Ashton & Lee, 2007). It is highly 
similar to BIG-5/FFM but has an additional dimension labeled “Honesty-Humility”, 
which measures the individual lack of interest in manipulating others for personal gain, 
and disinterest in status symbols and/or luxurious life style. Emotionality in HEXACO 
corresponds to Neuroticism in the FFM. The other dimensions of HEXACO are 
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Emotionality, the tendency to experience fear, anxiety, and need of assurance; 
eXtroversion, the tendency to experience positive feelings of enthusiasm and energy; 
Agreeableness, the tendency to be forgiving, lenient, flexible and patient; 
Conscientiousness, the tendency to stay organized, control one’s impulses and aspire for
perfection; and Openness to Experience, the tendency to be creative, curious, 
imaginative and appreciative of aesthetics. For a detailed description of HEXACO see 
1.4.2 above. For Cronbach's alphas, means and standard deviations see Table 3. All 
items were anchored from 1 (”Strongly disagree”) to 7 (”Strongly agree”).
2.2.2.4 Scales of Study 3.1
In Study 3.1, in addition to PES we used the following measures: Sensitivity to Losses 
scale, The Hope Scale, Satisfaction in Life Scale, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task 
(RMET), Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI), Self-rumination and Self-reflection
scales. 
Sensitivity to Losses scale was introduced in Palomäki et al.,(2014) and it 
consists of 11 items. It measures the extent to which players experience negative 
emotions (feelings of unfairness, anger and frustration) elicited by poker losses and has 
been shown to effectively predict the reported severity of tilting behavior. In essence, 
tilting in poker refers to losing control due to negative emotions and the resulting 
detrimental level of decision making. The scale has such items as: “I feel losing is 
unfair.” and “Losing is part of the game.” (reverse coded). The items were anchored 
from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”). Higher scores indicate a higher 
tendency to experience negative emotions elicited by losses, or in other words, higher 
scores indicate a higher sensitivity to losses (see Palomäki et al., 2014, for further 
details). We included this scale to better assess the validity of our previous findings 
(Palomäki et al., 2014) and to further evaluate whether sensitivity to losses shows 
comorbidity with problematic gambling in general.
The Hope Scale was developed by Snyder et al.,(1991; see also Snyder 1994; 
2002). It consists of 12 items (including 4 filler items). Snyder (2002) defines hope as 
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“the perceived capability to derive pathways to desired goals, and motivate oneself via 
agency thinking to use those pathways”. The scale has such items as: ”I energetically 
pursue my goals” and ”I can think of many ways to get the things in life that are 
important to me”. All items were anchored from 1 (”Definitely false”) to 8 (”Definitely 
true”). Higher scores indicate a higher tendency for goal-oriented behavior via feelings 
of agency. 
The Satisfaction in Life Scale was developed by Diener et al.,(1985) and is a 
robust measure of personal satisfaction in life on a very general level. The scale consists
of five items such as: ”I am satisfied with life” and ”In most ways my life is close to my
ideal”. All items were anchored from 1 (”Strongly disagree”) to 7 (”Strongly agree”). 
Higher scores indicate higher satisfaction in one's life, higher general emotional stability
and a reduced likelihood of depression (for a review, see Pavot & Diener, 1993). In 
other words we included this scale in our study to asses the general level of individuals 
mental well-being.
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (RMET) was developed by Baron-Cohen et 
al.,(2001). RMET is used to measure an individual's empathetic behavior and general 
ability to “be in another person's shoes”. The task consists of 36 close-up pictures of 
human eyes expressing an emotion. Participants are given four options to choose from, 
only one of which corresponds to the emotional tone of the eyes. Higher scores indicate 
higher levels of performance in the sub-facet of emotional intelligence measuring 
accuracy in perceiving the emotional states of others. See Figure 2 for an example.
Figure 2. An example item from Reading the Mind in The Eyes Task (see Baron-Cohen et al 2001)
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The Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) was developed by Ferris and 
Wynne (2001) and is among the best documented and validated measures of 
problematic gambling behavior (Orford et al., 2010). The scale has nine items such as: 
”In the past 12 months, how often have you needed to gamble with larger amounts of 
money to get the same excitement?” and ”In the past 12 months, how often have you 
felt guilty about the way you gamble or what happens when you gamble?”. All items 
were anchored from 1 (”Never”) to 4 (”Almost always”). Higher scores indicate higher 
levels of problematic gambling behavior. The scale was scored by averaging the items.
Self-rumination and self-reflection scales are components of the private self-
consciousness scale presented in Fenigstein et al.,(1975). Self-rumination is the 
tendency to dwell on negative past experiences. Thus, the scale measures the inability to
withdraw from constantly thinking about the negative consequences of one's past 
decisions. Self-reflection is an alternative type of self-inspection, namely a positive 
form of curiosity concerning one's emotions and cogitations. Fundamentally, self-
reflection refers to beneficial and thoughtful self-contemplation that is associated with 
mature coping mechanisms (Trapnell & Campbell 1999; Elliott & Coker 2008).
The Self-rumination scale consists of 10 items such as: ”I often reflect on 
unfavorable outcomes in my life” and ”It is easy for me to put unwanted thoughts out of
mind” (reverse coded). The Self-reflection scale consists of 12 items such as: ”Knowing
myself is very important to me” and ”Contemplating myself is something I don't do 
very often” (reverse coded). Both scales were anchored from 1 (”Strongly disagree”) to 
7 (”Strongly agree”). Higher scores in the self-rumination scale indicate higher tendency
to dwell on past negative events, while higher scores on the self-reflection scale indicate
an ability for a ”philosophical and detached” analysis of one's situation, decisions and 
emotions (see Elliott & Coker 2008). 
In Study 3.1, we included both the Satisfaction in Life and Hope scales due to 
their psychometric qualities and well-documented performance in assessing general 
mental stability. With the aid of these scales it is possible to identify potential mental 
health problems on a general level (e.g. Pavot & Diener, 1993). These scales were 
included to assess the construct validity of our previously developed Sensitivity to 
Losses scale. Since the link between PES and PGSI has not been previously assessed, 
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we included these scales to strengthen our convergence/divergence validity assessment. 
In our previous studies we showed that reflection and rumination predict 
mathematically correct decision making in poker and that sensitivity to losses predicts 
tilting severity (Palomäki et al., 2013a, 2013b). By including rumination, reflection and 
losing sensitivity measures to this study as well, we were building on our previous 
studies. Including these two scales also makes it possible for us to estimate the 
robustness of our previous and present findings
2.2.2.5 Scales of Study 3.2
In Study 3.2 we used the following scales: PES, Social Value Orientation and the South 
Oaks Gambling Screen. Social Value Orientation (SVO) originated in game theory 
research and its use in studying individual differences in behaviour has been well-
documented and validated (Van Lange et al., 1997). SVO is utilized as a method for 
profiling people into one of three categories: Pro-social, individualistic, and competitive
(Messick & McCllintock, 1968; Van Lange et al., 1997). SVO is based on the 
assumption that the values people have influence profoundly the strategies they use in 
various economic games. SVO includes nine items, where people are asked to allocate 
points between themselves and another imaginary player (“the other”). The choices are 
presented in the form of decomposed game matrices. These matrices are deduced from 2
x 2 prisoner's dilemma game matrices through a formal logical analysis. An example 
game matrix item is: “Please choose the option you prefer, for any reason, from the 
following ones: A) You get 480 points and the other gets 80, B) You get 540 points and 
the other gets 280, C) You both get 480 points”. in the example above, the choices 
correspond to the following social value orientation tendencies: A) Competitive – 
maximum relative difference between the self and the other, B) Individualistic – 
maximum absolute gain for the self, and C) Pro-social – equal and maximized joint gain
between the self and the other. We coded the item into a continuous measure by 
calculating the difference in allocated resources between the self and the other. This 
resulted in a bi-polar scale. Composing the scale in this way makes it possible to 
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differentiate between pro-social (i.e., non-selfish) and pro-self (i.e., selfish) behavior. 
See Figure 3 for a listing of these items.
Figure 3. Listing of SVO items
The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) is a diagnostic tool used in clinical 
settings to detect individuals with gambling related disorders (Lesieur & Blume, 1987). 
It is usually scored with dichotomous yes-no questions and it has several filler or mock 
items. The maximum score is 20 and usually 5 is used as a cut-off point for diagnosing 
someone with a gambling problem. For the purposes of our study, we used a modified 
version of SOGS. We omitted the items that are not scored and transformed the 
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A B C
1 You get 480 540 480
Other gets 80 280 480
A B C
2 You get 560 500 500
Other gets 300 500 100
A B C
3 You get 520 520 580
Other gets 520 120 320
A B C
4 You get 500 560 490
Other gets 100 300 490
A B C
5 You get 560 500 490
Other gets 300 500 90
A B C
6 You get 500 500 570
Other gets 500 500 300
A B C
7 You get 510 560 510
Other gets 510 300 110
A B C
8 You get 550 500 500
Other gets 300 100 500
A B C
9 You get 480 490 540
Other gets 100 490 300
remaining 13 items into 7-point Likert scales anchored from 1 (“Never”) to 7 (“Very 
often”). Higher scores indicate higher levels of problematic gambling behavior. 
We modified the scale to increase transparency between SOGS and the standard
questionnaire instruments that are more typically utilized in the domain of social and 
personality psychology. In social and personality psychology, there is an increasing 
trend to move away from categorical instruments. In the light of accumulating data, 
theories of personality have come to suggest that personality disorders should not be 
viewed as particular categories. Rather, they should be viewed as rare personality trait 
constellations that nonetheless are within the boundaries of normal variation (Matthews 
& Deary, 1998). Similar arguments can be made regarding the categorical diagnostics 
used to screen pathological gambling; it is only a matter of administrative convention to 
define someone as a problematic (or disordered) gambler based on whether his/her score
on SOGS is above a specific cut-off point. Furthermore, Likert-scoring on a scale from 
1 to 7 per item – as opposed to the conventional method of calculating a score based on 
dichotomous yes/no questions – results in higher resolution (i.e., higher variance in 
absolute terms). This makes it possible to calculate more accurate correlations between 
SOGS and other social psychological variables. 
2.2.2.6 Scales of Study 3.3
In Study 3.3, we employed the following scales: Srole's Anomia Scale, Marginaliztion 
of Society (MOS) Alienation Scale, Social Well-being scale, Emotional Intelligence 
scale and the Self-Control Scale. All the relevant metrics of the scales are portrayed in 
Table 3.
It has been claimed that Srole's Anomia scale (Srole, 1956) is among the most 
commonly used sociological and/or psychometric instruments in social sciences 
(Caruana, Ramaseshan, & Ewing, 2000; see Seeman, 1991 for validity assessment). The
scale measures the extent to which an individual feels he/she is integrated to his/her 
society and its values. Anomie is usually negatively correlated with happiness and life 
satisfaction (Keyes, 1998). We implemented a six-item version of the scale, which we 
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obtained from the annual General Social Survey of the US National Opinion Research 
Center. The Srole anomia scale has been part of this survey since 1973. An example 
item is: ”You sometimes can't help wondering whether anything is worthwhile 
anymore”. All the items were anchored from 1 (”Strongly disagree”) to 7 (”Strongly 
agree”). Higher scores indicate higher levels of anomie – i.e., the experience of of 
detachment from one's society and its values.
Marginalization of Society Alienation Scale (MOS) is an alternative measure of 
social alienation (Travis, 1993). It was developed in response to the criticism of Srole's 
scale described above. According to Travis (1993), Srole's scale is unable to accurately 
distinguish alienation in subcultures and small-scale communities, so we supplemented 
our study with another anomie/alienation measure as well. We obtained a six-item 
version of the MOS scale from the annual General Social Survey of the US National 
Opinion Research Center. An example item is: ”The people running the country don't 
really care what happens to you.” All the items were anchored from 1 (”Strongly 
disagree”) to 7 (”Strongly agree”). Higher scores indicate higher level of alienation 
from society. 
The Social well-being scale was developed by Keyes (1995; 1998; Keyes & 
Shapiro 2004) and includes 14 items. It measures a person's sense of involvement with 
other people and with his/her community. This scale includes such items as: “People do 
not care about other people’s problems”, “Society isn’t improving for people like me”, 
and “I believe that people are kind” (reverse coded). The questions were anchored from 
1 (”Strongly disagree”) to 7 (”Strongly agree”). Higher scores indicate higher levels of 
social well-being.
The Emotional Intelligence scale is a self-report instrument developed by 
Schutte et al.,(1998) and it consists of 33 items. The scale differentiates accurately 
between therapists and their clients, with therapists scoring higher on the scale. In 
addition, high scoring individuals display lower levels of pessimism and impulsivity 
(Schutte et al., 1998). Example items are: ”I am aware of my emotions as I experience 
them”, and ”It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do” 
(reverse coded). All the items were anchored from 1 (”Strongly disagree”) to 7 
(”Strongly agree”). Higher scores indicate higher levels of emotional intelligence. 
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The self-control scale was developed by Tangney, Baumeister and Boone 
(2004), and it consists of 36 items. We used a short 13-item version of the scale. The 
Self-Control is negatively associated with psychological pathologies and social 
deviance, and positively associated with the quality of social and familial ties. 
Furthermore, it is positively associated with abilities in perspective-taking and 
negatively associated with a ruminative tendency to ”wallow” in various negative 
aspects of life (Tangey et al., 2004). Self-control is further positively associated with 
proficient anger management and motivation to forgo binge eating and binge drinking 
(Tangey et al., 2004). Example items are: ”Getting up in the morning is hard for me” 
and ”People would say I have iron self-discipline”. All the items were anchored from 1 
(”Not at all like me”) to 7 (”Very much like me”). Higher scores indicate higher levels 
of self-control.
All anomie/alienation and wellbeing scales (MOS, Srole’s anomia scale and 
Social well-being scale) were included to assess the possible sociological (rather than 
just psychological) consequences of poker playing. The self-control scale was included 
in this study, since it has been shown to correlate with working memory capacity and 
“mature” decisions and it seems to be a general protective buffer against mental illness 
in general. The Emotional intelligence scale was included to see if self-reported 
emotional intelligence has a different effect on poker experience than the actual 
performance measure (RMET, see above).
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Table 3: Listing of all the variables and relevant statistics used in Studies 1–3.
Scale M SD Items Range Cronbach's α
Study 1
PES4 
(Same scale in Study 2)
4.62 2.00 4 1.0 – 9.5 0.75
Poker Decision Tasks 0.66 0.21 5 0.00 – 1 N/A
Study 2
PES4 4.62 2.00 4 1.0 – 9.5 0.75
HEXACO:
Honesty-Humility 4.23 1.04 6 1.3 – 7.0 0.75
Emotionality 3.45 0.93 6 1.2 – 6.1 0.73
Extroversion 4.20 1.03 6 1.0 – 7.0 0.81
Agreeableness 4.20 0.91 6 1.3 – 6.9 0.74
Conscientiousness 4.53 0.90 6 2.4 – 6.6 0.74
Openness to Experience 4.75 1.01 6 1.5 – 6.7 0.76
Study 3.1
PES3 4.97 1.98 3 1.0–9.66 0.69
Sensitivity to Losses 3.31 0.96 11 1.0–5.9 0.81
Hope scale 5.09 0.94 12 2.0–7.5 0.78
Self-Reflection 4.87 1.01 12 1.5–7.0 0.88
Self-Rumination 4.24 1.17 10 2.08-7.0 0.90
RMET 24 4.12 32 6.0 – 33 N /A
PGSI 1.41 0.45 9 1 – 4 0.85
Study 3.2
PES3 4.68 1.92 3 1.00 – 9.33 0.74
Social Value Orientation N/A N/A 9 N/A N/A
Modified SOGS 2.22 0.93 13 1.00 – 6.92 0.84
Study 3.3
PES3 4.79 2.19 3 1.00 – 9.67 0.80
Srole's Anomie Scale 3.2 1.07 6 1.00 – 7.00 0.69
MOS Alienation Scale 3.93 1.03 6 1.00 – 7.00 0.70
Social Well-being Scale 3.16 0.76 11 1.21 – 5.85 0.79
Emotional Intelligence Scale 4.88 0.71 33 1.54 – 6.60 0.91
Self-control Scale 4.11 0.76 13 1.69 – 6.53 0.78
Abbreviations: PES: Poker Experience Scale; RMET: Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task; PGSI: 
Problem Gambling Severity Index; SOGS: South Oaks Gambling Screen
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2.3 Data analysis
All data were analyzed with SPSS and with custom Python scripts using the 
Statsmodels 5.0 statistics library. Python Statsmodels was used because it is an open 
source alternative for statistical analyses and freely available. We have intentions to 
make our anonymized data and its analysis publicly available to increase transparency 
in science.
In analyzing the data for Study 1, we used a two-way ANOVA with simple 
contrast codings with Type III Sum of Squares for significance testing. In the following 
analyses the updated version of Poker Experience Scale (PES4) was used. In other 
words, the analyses of the published Study 1 were redone for transparency (i.e. 
confirmed with a newer version of PES).The results are slightly stronger with our four 
item version of PES (PES4). All the other analyses were normal bivariate Pearson 
correlations. 
Additional analyses for more technically oriented readers have been presented 
in the Appendix 2. These analyses were conducted with R and with R lavaan package 
(freely available from online). As a general note, the structural equation models, 
covariance path analyses and multiple regression analyses presented in the Appendix 2 
do not add anything to the results presented in the main text. The results and the 
interpretations stay exactly the same. 
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3. RESULTS
3.1 Study 1
Hypotheses 1 and 2 (H1 and H2) were tested by employing a full factorial PES4 
adjusted ANOVA with the average score calculated from the decision making tasks as 
the the dependent variable (DV, see APPENDIX 1). Social identity salience 
manipulation (SIS; i.e., eyes on the screen vs. black box on the screen), Anger prime 
(AP; i.e., anger prime vs. neutral prime) and Gender were entered into the model as 
categorical variables. The PES4 adjustment was statistically significant (B = 0.026, F(1,
450) = 23.29, p < .001). This supported H2, indicating that experienced poker players 
make mathematically more accurate decisions than inexperienced ones. Also the main 
effect of Anger prime (B = 0.08, F(1,450) = 3.77, p < .05, supporting H1) and the 
interaction effect between SIS and AP were statistically significant (F(1, 450) = 3.70, p 
< .05; supporting H1).This indicates that anger, especially in a social context, is 
detrimental for poker decision making accuracy. The interaction effect with 95% CIs is 
plotted in Figure 4. Full statistics of the model presented above are shown in Table 4. 
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Figure 4. Interaction effect between the emotion salience manipulation and identity salience 
manipulation. The interaction effect is driven by the slope between the identity salience manipulation in 
the control condition and in the anger prime condition. ( B = 0.18, F(1,450) = 5.73, p. = .02). The results 
are controlled for PES4. Error Bars are 95% CIs
The simple slopes of the interaction in Figure 4 were assessed for significance 
with a planned contrast analysis. This revealed that the differences between the Anger- 
and Neutral prime condition means were significant only during the “eyes on the 
screen” SIS -manipulation ( Manger = 0.55, SDanger= 0.61 vs. Mcontrol= 0.73 SDcontrol= 0.46; 
B = 0.18, F(1,450) = 5.73, p = .02 partial η² = .009). This difference was not observed 
during the “black moving box on the screen” condition (F < 1, p = n.s). Thus, in 
accordance with H1, anger in a social context is detrimental for poker decision making 
accuracy.
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Table 4. Full factorial ANOVA statistics. Average number of correct responses to the five poker decision 
tasks is the dependent variable. The model is controlled for Gender and Poker Experience Scale.
Factor B t p par.η²
Anger Prime
(Hypothesis 1)
0.022 2.04 .04 .009
Moving Eyes on Screen 0.140 1.06 n.s <.001
Anger Prime × Moving Eyes
(Hypothesis 1)
0.343 2.04 .03 .0085
Gender 0.080 1.13 n.s. .003
Gender × Anger Prime 0.024 1.69 n.s .007
Gender × Moving Eyes 0.079 1.01 n.s .002
Gender × Moving Eyes × Anger 0.317 1.82 n.s .007
 Poker Experience Scale
(Hypothesis 2)
0.032 6.31 < .001 .08
Note: Model statistics: F(8, 450) = 7.71, adj. R²=0.11; B-values are calculated from estimated marginal 
means. A significant interaction effect was observed between the anger prime and the identity salience 
manipulation (moving eyes on screen). Hypothesis 1 was supported as the main effect of anger prime 
was significant. For the interaction plot, see Figure 4. Hypothesis 2 was fully supported. Hypothesis 
relevant cells have been highlighted
3.2 Study 2
We analyzed the Pearson correlations between PES4, Engagement in Live Play, and all 
HEXACO dimensions (see Table 5). PES was moderately negatively correlated with 
Emotionality ( r(478) = -.18, p<.001). Engagement in Live Play was weakly positively 
correlated with Extroversion, Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience. PES had 
a weak negative correlation with Engagement in Live Play, indicating that experience 
might be best gained by not limiting oneself to playing merely live poker, where it is 
more difficult to get to play a large number of hands (i.e. rounds of play) due to the 
relatively slow pace of the game. We also correlated the individual items of PES with 
the HEXACO dimensions. All PES items were negatively correlated with Emotionality, 
and the PES item “Number of Years Played” was positively correlated with 
Extroversion (see Table 6). We thus found support for both of our hypotheses in Study 
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2, namely that emotionally stable poker players are more likely to have accumulated 
higher levels of poker experience and that extroversion is positively associated with a 
preference for live poker play. – We also ran a multiple regression analysis (controlling 
for age) and a covariance path analysis for the analysis presented in Table 5. The results 
and their interpretations stay exactly the same (See APPENDIX 2)
Table 5. Correlations between Poker Experience Scale (PES), Preference for Live Play and HEXACO-
60 personality inventory dimensions
Scale or Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. PES 1 -.02 -.18*** .01 -.01 -.01 -.07 -.11*
2. Honesty-humility 1 .00 -.08 .21*** .13** .09* .02
3. Emotionality 1 -.14** .03 -.03 .06 -.00
4. Extroversion 1 .1 .10* .15** .11*
5. Agreeableness 1 .06 .02 -.04
6. Conscientiousness 1 .06 .10*
7. Openness to Experience 1 .10*
8. Do You Play Live? 1
Notes: * : p < .05; **: p < .01; ***p <.001; a: p <.1. Hypothesis relevant cells have been highlighted
Table 6. Individual Poker Experience Scale (PES) item correlations with HEXACO-60 dimensions
HEXACO Dimension
PES Items H E X A C O
1. Number of Years Played .02 -.07a .12** .02 .05 -.01
2. Number of Hands Played -.03 -.12** .02 .02 -.03 -.07a
3. Level of Stakes Played At -.04 -.23*** -.02 -.03 .04 -.08a
4. Do you consider yourself 
professional?
.02 -.11* -.05 .02 -.03 -.03
Notes: * : p < .05; **: p < .01; ***p <.001; a: p.<.1.  relevant cells have been highlighted
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3.3. Study 3
3.3.1 Study 3.1
A bivariate correlation matrix was calculated between all the variables (see Table 7). 
PGSI was negatively correlated with the measures of well-being and empathizing 
abilities, and positively correlated with self-rumination and sensitivity to losses (in line 
with H1). PGSI was also significantly positively correlated with PES3 (r(478) = 0.2, p <
.001, as predicted by H2), suggesting that experience in poker players is likely to be 
expressed as symptomatic problematic gambling behavior. However, there were no 
significant correlations between PES and the measures of well-being, or between PES 
and empathizing abilities, whereas there were significant negative correlations between 
PES and self-rumination, and between PES and sensitivity to losses (lending partial 
support for H3: See Table 7). We also ran a covariance path analysis for the data. 
Interpretation stays almost the same, with the exception that Poker experience is weakly
positively related to the Hope scale, indicating that gaining experience in poker could be
related  to optimism or positive mental health (see Appendix 2). However this does not 
tell us which way the causation flows.
Table 7. Correlation Matrix For Study 3.1
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. PGSI 1 .20*** –.15*** –.15*** –.22*** .24*** –.02n.s. .15*** –.1*
2. Poker experience 1 –.02n.s. –.06n.s. –.03n.s. –.19*** –.02n.s. –.11* –.03n.s.
3. Satisfaction in life 1 .55*** .12** –.08* –.01n.s. –.33*** .14**
4. Hope 1 .10* –.11* .29*** –.20*** .14**
5. RMET 1 –.01n.s. .15** –.01n.s. .11*
6. Sensitivity to losses 1 –.03n.s. .27*** –.01n.s.
7. Self-reflection 1 .30*** –.02n.s.
8. Self-rumination 1 –.08a
9. Level of education 1
Note. n.s. = not significant; a p <.1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. PGSI = Problem Gambling 
Severity Index. RMET = Reading the mind in the eyes -task.
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3.3.2 Study 3.2
A bivariate correlation matrix was calculated between all the variables (see Table 8). 
There was no correlation between the continuous SVO scale and PES (r(417) = 0.03, p 
= n.s.). SOGS and SVO were weakly positively correlated (r(417) = 0.08, p < .1.). 
SOGS and PES were significantly positively correlated (r(417) = 0.29, p < .001). These 
results appear to indicate that experience in poker is associated with behavior that is 
classified by SOGS as problematic and that poker experience is not associated with a 
tendency to act selfishly. For Study 3.2, we hypothesized that there would be no link 
between poker experience and selfish/competitive behaviors, but that there could be a 
link between selfish behaviors and pathological gambling tendencies, which is what we 
found.
Table 8. Correlation Matrix for Study 2
Variables 1. 2. 3.
1. Poker experience 1 .29*** .03n.s.
2. SOGS 1 .08a
3. SVO 1
Note. n.s. = not significant; a p <.1; ***p < .001. SOGS = South Oaks Gambling Screen. SVO = Social 
Value Orientation (scale).
3.3.3 Study 3.3
A bivariate correlation matrix was calculated between all the variables (see Table 9). 
Unsurprisingly, social well-being was negatively correlated with anomie, social (MOS) 
alienation, and positively correlated with self-control and emotional intelligence 
(supporting H2). Self-control and emotional intelligence were also positively correlated 
(supporting H3). Anomie was positively correlated with social alienation, and both were
negatively correlated with self-control and emotional intelligence. Poker experience was
marginally negatively correlated with MOS alienation, meaning that participants with 
more poker experience reported – albeit marginally – lower levels of social alienation 
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(supporting H1, see discussion). No other correlations between PES and other variables 
were found. These results imply that poker experience is not strongly related to social 
well-being, alienation, emotional intelligence (or emotional disorders) or impulsivity. 
See Table 9 for full statistics. However we also ran a covariance path analysis for the 
correlation table presented below, where we found that poker experience might actually 
buffer against alienation when all the other measures of the model are kept controlled 
for (see Appendix 2)
Table 9. Correlation Matrix For Study 3
Scales 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. Poker experience 1 –.01n.s. –.04n.s. –.1a –.02n.s. –.03n.s.
2. Social well-being 1 –.48*** –.53*** .23*** .49**
3. Srole's anomia 1 .54*** –.19** –.18***
4. MOS alienation 1 –.23*** –.16**
5. Self-control 1 .20***
6. Emotional intelligence 1
Note. n.s. = not significant; a p <.1; **p < .01; *** p < .001. Relevant cells have been highlighted
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4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Results with respect to the hypotheses
In Study 1, we confirmed experimentally the implications of our previous qualitative 
and correlational studies (Palomäki et al., 2013a; 2013b; 2014). We also confirmed both
our current Hypotheses. With respect to H1, we found that the emotion of anger 
together with the social context of the task environment are likely precedents for 
mathematically inaccurate decisions in a poker task. With respect to H2, we confirmed 
that PES4 accurately predicts mathematically accurate decisions in poker.  
The results of Study 2 clarify the question whether playing poker helps to 
increase emotional stability, or whether some individuals manage to become thriving 
poker players due to their pre-existing emotional stability. The answer seems to be that 
those who are naturally emotionally stable are more likely to develop expertice in poker.
We also found support for our hypothesis regarding the personality traits of the players 
that prefer live playing (as opposed to prefering playing online): extroverted 
individuals, and individuals who are open to experiences prefer to play in live settings. 
Naturally correlation does not imply causation, however, correlation is a 
prerequisite for causation. Furthermore, given that the present interpretation of 
personality as something that has a strong hereditary (or genetic) component, it is 
possible that emotional stability has some causal influence on ones success as a poker 
player. Most likely the genetic components of personality are already present in the 
person when he/she starts playing poker (see 4.2 for further discussion). 
In Study 3.1, we hypothesized that H1) problematic gambling would correlate 
positively with lower emotion-regulation abilities, H2) problematic gambling would 
correlate positively with poker playing experience and H3) poker playing experience 
would correlate positively with measures of wellbeing and emotional intelligence. H1 
and H2 were fully supported, indicating that, on the face of it, poker experience is 
predictive of pathological gambling habits. This, however, is arguably not the case, 
since poker experience was uncorrelated with any negative effects related to wellbeing. 
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In fact, H3 received partial support, since we found that that the ability to withstand 
poker losses correlates with poker experience relatively strongly (however, no 
correlations with RMET scores or other wellbeing scores were observed). This implies 
that poker is not a training ground for general skills related to emotional intelligence, 
and that the ability to withstand losses could be a context dependent (i.e. a poker 
related) trait measure.
In Study 3.2 we found full support for our hypothesis. We predicted that there 
would be no link between poker experience and selfish or competitive behaviors. 
Furthermore, we predicted that there could be a link between selfish behaviors and 
pathological gambling tendencies (i.e., that there could be a marginally significant 
association between SVO and SOGS). This seems to imply that poker experience is 
probably not linked with sociopathy or Machiavellian tendencies (see discussion 
below).
Our hypotheses for Study 3.3 were the following: H1) no association should be 
found between poker experience and social anomie or alienation, H2) negative 
association should exist between anomie/alienation with respect to self-control, social 
wellbeing and emotional intelligence measures H3) positive associations should be 
observed between measures or social wellbeing, self-control and emotional intelligence. 
All these hypotheses were supported, albeit H1 received stronger support than expected 
(slight negative correlation). 
To summarize the results of Studies 3.1 through 3.3, we obtained evidence 
suggesting that extensive poker experience is not linked to social isolation, anomie, 
selfishness, self-control issues or proximate markers of alexithymia (i.e. pathologically 
low levels of intrapersonal emotional intelligence), but, at the same time, these 
participants still seemed to exhibit gambling problems [!]. Studies 3.1 through 3.3 thus 
seem to imply that both SOGS and PGSI might be too sensitive in diagnosing internet 
poker players with a psychological illness, although these players in fact are seemingly 
healthy and well adjusted. The results even allude to marginal health benefits associated
with poker (see further below). This is highly relevant since SOGS and PGSI, even in 
their modified Likert forms, had exactly the construct validity we expected them to have
(for limitations see below).
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4.2 Implications
The results of Study 1 imply that the negative consequences of gambling in poker 
players (i.e. bad investment decisions) are not in themselves necessarily a marker of 
psychopathology. Taken together with our previous research, the findings imply that 
detrimental decisions made in anger happen to normal healthy people. It also seems that
anger could play a role in the processes that lead to irrational decisions in poker, 
especially if the situation is social. The results of Study 2 seem to support this 
conclusion, since they imply that there is a selection effect involved in developing poker
expertise: people who are naturally emotionally stable are capable of standing the 
pressures of the game. It is well known that Emotionality (or Neuroticism in the FFM) 
is consistently associated with development of psychopathologies (e.g. Ormel, 
Rosmalen & Farmer, 2004; Widiger & Trull, 1992; Widiger, 2011). However, the results
of Study 2 imply that emotionally unstable people are likely to steer clear from playing 
poker. This then, could even further attenuate the false positive effects associated with 
SOGS and PGSI (e.g. Goodie et al, 2013; Kincaid et al, 2013).
Studies 3.1–3.3 further support the aforesaid conclusion. Based on the evidence 
it seems that playing poker is not something that exposes people to the risk of 
developing problematic gambling habits. Whatever the factor that predisposes people to 
develop pathological behaviors in gambling, it seems unlikely that it would be the 
gambling games themselves, or online poker specifically. 
Taken together, the results from Studies 1–3 have wider implications not only 
for gambling research, but also for decision-making sciences in general. We have 
provided early evidence showing that, scientifically speaking, there is a need for a 
perspective shift in how we view poker players in online environments. Moreover, there
needs to be a shift in how we perceive the mental states of poker players and their 
ability to successfully make correct decisions in a complicated settings, which are 
demanding in emotional and mathematical/cognitive terms. Up to now, the literature in 
the field of gambling studies has mostly focused on the clinical aspects of poker playing
(e.g. Laplante et al., 2009; Mitrovic & Brown, 2009; Tryggvesson, 2006; Jiménez-
Murcia et al., 2011) and has consequently overlooked some essential sides of it. These 
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include psychological phenomena such as identity processes, social support networks, 
friendships, emotions and decision-making processes. These are all conceivably 
connected to the game of poker and its sub-cultures and also to their likely effects on 
wellbeing. In addition, the subject matter of gambling should be of interest for a wider 
range of decision-making sciences. The results presented here imply that the actual 
decisions that are made in gambling games can be studied from an interdisciplinary 
angle, whereby the antecedents of particular decisions can be understood.
Furthermore, if the results of Studies 1–3 are taken as a whole, we can 
understand the large influence that emotions and emotional stability have on decisions 
made in poker. Despite the fact that emotional stability is correlated with poker playing 
experience, emotionally engaging vignettes can disrupt rational decision-making – when
the level of poker experience is held constant – especially if the context implies the 
presence of others. Furthermore, experience gained in playing poker seems to be 
reliably linked to the ability to withstand losses (see Study 3.1 and Palomäki et al.., 
2014).
In a clinical framework, the results are illuminating too. The results are 
especially relevant for parties working with gambling-related harm prevention, such as 
counselors, therapists, addiction centers and psychiatric professionals of different 
stripes. Understanding the dual process dynamics of human emotions and rationality 
seems to offer ways for educating healthy gamblers on how to avoid making bad 
decisions (and lose money). Public awareness campaigns that urge people not to drink 
and drive are well-known and effective in many ways. Similarly, campaigns that 
educate gamblers about their emotions could save some families from disasters 
(“Feeling grumpy? Then play tomorrow. Studies show that negative moods make you 
less rational”). Gambling problems are of high importance to modern societies and 
therefore there are possible benefits to be gained from understanding the 
emotional/cognitive processes and individual differences that predispose some 
individuals to develop ludomania (i.e. pathological gambling habits). It also seems that 
the instruments used to diagnose pathological gambling need to be revised to 
accommodate the special features of internet based poker playing to avoid treating those
who are not (mentally) ill. – This detail is already taken into consideration in the clinical
65
practice where the diagnosis of the gambling problem is supplemented with an 
interview. 
Study 1 together with an increasing number of similar studies have also some 
methodological implications (Seale & Phelan 2009; Liley & Rakow 2009). It seems that
the paradigm introduced in Study 1 enables for investigating the social, emotional, 
mathematical and experiential components of decision-making. This implies that poker 
could be a relevant addition into the tool-kit of micro-economists, economic and social 
psychologists, and other experts of decision-making sciences. Study 1 provides further 
validation of Palomäki et al.,(2013a), where poker experience was linked to better 
mathematical decision-making in poker. For Study 1, we created another five fictional 
decision-making scenarios in which poker experience was reliably linked to better 
performance, implying that the method of creating rational decision-making scenarios 
like we have, is feasible.
During the last years, the field of judgment and decision-making research has 
accumulated evidence showing that understanding emotions is important in a decision-
making context. For instance, witnessing unfair offers in ultimatum game is correlated 
with disgust-related brain activity (Sanfey et al., 2003), and induced disgust increases 
the likelihood of rejecting unfair offers in the Ultimatum game (Moretti & Di 
Pellegrino, 2011). Furthermore, Fehr & Gächter (2002; see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004) 
have reported that decisions to engage in costly punishment behavior are associated 
with self-reported feelings of anger. Additionally, extensive research employing the 
Iowa Gambling Task (Brevers, Bechara, Cleeremans & Noël, 2013) implies that the 
value of money is at least partially scaffolded on the brain responses in areas related to 
emotional processing, without which decisions to switch from bad investment decisions 
to better ones seem to be compromised (for a review, see Brevers, Bechara, Cleeremans 
& Noël, 2013). 
Studies in evolutionary psychology and microeconomics also show that humans
exhibit a natural tendency for punishing others for unfair offers and selfish behaviors 
(e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Arguably, by doing so they 
reduce the likelihood of selfish behaviors occurring in the future and signal 
unwillingness to tolerate exploitation. However, this behavior is not displayed when 
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people play the ultimatum game against computer opponents (Sanfey et al., 2003). 
Punishing computers for selfish behavior would be pointless since there are no intuitive 
(or implicit) reasons to assume that computers would change their behaviour (i.e., 
programming). Expressed with the language of dual processing models, System 1 level 
mechanisms — such as the emotion of anger — are context-sensitive and capable of 
making conceptual distinctions between living and non-living entities (for a review of 
intuitive ontology, see Boyer and Barrett 2005). We can therefore embed the findings of 
Study 1 within the context of decision-making sciences and the dual processing model 
more generally.
Normatively rational decision-making, especially in the context of economics, 
is generally presumed to be reached through System 2-type deliberation (Kahneman, 
2011). However, System 1 level processes regarding emotional and social information 
are unavoidably incorporated into this process. In the context of poker, this seems to be 
detrimental to the subjective assessment of successful investment decisions (i.e. whether
to fold or call). It seems to be relatively straightforward to conclude then that 
experimental poker studies, such as this one, contribute in a fruitful way to the ongoing 
discussion on how emotions and social situations hinder or enhance performance in 
game theoretical settings. Normative rationality and its violations in highly experienced 
participants can be studied using poker. More importantly, in our study the social 
context and emotional processes were clearly disruptive of normative decisions. In real 
life, playing in the state of anger could translate to excess financial losses, since internet
poker requires constant conscious deliberation and rapid assessment of relative hand 
strengths with a relatively fast pace. Possibly the effects observed in Study 1 could be 
stronger, if the participants played for real money.
Taking a microscopic view of the results of Study 2, it seems that the 
individuals who are most likely to develop proficient System 2 level processing abilities
in a poker context are those who are naturally emotionally stable. There is some 
evidence suggesting that introverts are naturally more prone to develop their skills in 
poker, because they prefer playing online (e.g., Brown & Mitchell, 2010), where the 
number of decision per minute is much higher than in a live game, as people can play at 
several tables simultaneously. Also, we found that the preference for live poker was 
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negatively associated with levels of poker experience. We assume that this negative 
correlation is due to similar reasons as the correlation between introversion and poker 
experience. Namely, online poker is more easily available and is more fast paced than 
regular poker.
When we analyzed the correlations between individual PES4 items and 
HEXACO dimensions, we found that all of the individual items correlated with 
emotional stability. However, the item which was most strongly correlated with 
emotional stability was the one measuring the level of stakes played at. This suggests 
that one of the most important factors in developing poker skill is the ability to cope 
with emotional pressure emanating from the risk of losing monetary investments. Lower
levels of emotionality were thus associated with a smaller number of hands played and 
with less self-reported professionalism in poker. Given that the number of years played 
was only marginally correlated with emotionality, we conjectured that there might exist 
a minority group of recreational players who have played consistently for years, but 
who have not climbed up the stakes. The individuals who fit this profile would probably
not gain as much from emotional stability as other sub-populations.
Given that success in poker seems to be related to natural emotion regulation 
aptitudes and that acute emotional states are predictive of detrimental decision-making, 
the results of Studies 3.1–3.3 become more pronounced. The main results of Studies 
3.1–3.3 imply that accumulated poker experience is probably unrelated to psychosocial 
-wellbeing. More importantly, it seems that normal healthy individuals can play online 
poker without major risks of becoming psychologically ill, selfish, alexithymic or 
socially alienated. Careful examination of the results implies that there might be some 
mild health benefits associated with online poker playing. We found a negative marginal
relationship between poker experience and the Mos Alienation scale (p < .1 , Study 3.3) 
and we further found significant negative associations between PES and sensitivity to 
losses (Study 3.1) and between PES and ruminative tendencies (Study 3.1). 
Paradoxically, however, there were significant correlations between accumulated poker 
experience and problem gambling measures (namely SOGS and PGSI), without 
significant correlations between problem gambling measures and wellbeing, emotional 
intelligence or selfishness measures. This effect is attenuated by the problem gambling 
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measures showing good convergence validities. This means that the present instruments 
are probably not suited for diagnosing pathological aspects of internet poker playing and
should not be used in the way they have been until now, since it renders the findings less
reliable.
4.3 Limitations
The limitations of these studies are the standard limitations facing any internet-based 
questionnaires, which include (among others) different forms of demand characteristics 
or experimenter effects. Another general limitation of questionnaire studies using self-
report measures is the likelihood that some participants give false information or try to 
guess the study hypotheses. This can lead either to intentional mock replies or overly 
“polished” responses  to please the researchers. 
Moreover, Studies 1, 2 and 3.1 could have selected for individuals who were 
more patient than the average poker player, since the average time to complete the 
questionnaire was 40 minutes, albeit this is not unusually long for an internet study. 
Nowadays taking part in internet surveys is relatively common and these usually last at 
least 30 minutes. A limitation in Study 2 could be that the sample was possibly more 
curious than the population average, since openness to experience scores deviated from 
the scale mid-point by 0.7 (in other words, poker players could be more open to 
experiences than the population average). Going further, because our samples were 
collected from online poker-playing communities, we assume that most participants had
at least some poker playing experience. Therefore, we cannot compare poker players 
with non-poker-players. Comparing poker players with poker naïve population with 
respect to these dimensions is a topic for a future research .
In addition to the standard set of questionnaire limitations of self-selection, 
experimenter effects and demand characteristics, there are limitations that apply to each 
of the individual studies. In Study 1, the use of new stimulus material could be a 
possible limitation. We used pairs of moving human eyes as a proxy/cue for social 
presence, which was a step up from previous research where pictures of static eyes have
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been used (e.g., Bateson, Nettle & Roberts, 2006). It could be argued that the moving 
eyes stimulus would need to be set up against another set of controls, where the possible
disruption of working memory, attentional blinking and other more basic cognitive 
functions are taken into consideration in more detail. Moving eyes, however, are more 
ecologically valid than static eyes and any disruptions of working memory or attentional
focus would be exactly due to the fact that they are human eyes. Humans have special 
brain areas for detecting faces and humans have automatic tendencies for ”joint 
attention”; in other words, we care about what other people care about, and what others 
care about grabs our attention (e.g., Bruinsma, Koegel & Koegel 2004). 
It is possible that similar disruptions on decision-making could be achieved by 
other means as well (e.g. loud syncopated atonal music or holding a number series in 
your mind while doing the tasks). However, this would not mean that the moving eyes 
are not an effective experimental manipulation in their own right (due to the specific 
effect human eyes and faces have on other humans), separate from working memory 
disruptions etc. Furthermore, previous experiments that elicited the audience effect used
only pictures of static eyes. Proper controlling, testing and validation of the stimulus 
should take this into consideration as well. In previous research, where static eyes have 
been used as a stimulus, pictures of flowers have been used as controls. For future 
research , also these types of controls (e.g., pictures of flowers) should be incorporated 
in to the proper validation tests of the moving eyes stimuli.
Furthermore, the dependent variables in Study 1 were hypothetical decision-
making scenarios. It can be argued that these decision-making scenarios lack ecological 
validity. These scenarios were textual descriptions of poker game situations and 
different from the graphically rich online virtual environments or live poker tables. 
These descriptions were in a sense minimal representations of the poker environments, 
portraying only the bare essentials needed for assessing the expected values of folding 
(not investing) and calling (investing; See Figure 1). However, if the results were 
obtained with such materials, the benefit is that there were no other confounds due to 
colorful graphics or associations related to casino environments. Study 1 was the second
study to employ this method of assessing mathematical accuracy of poker players in an 
online questionnaire, and the results seem to be convergent, lending credence to the 
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method. The final limitation for Study 1 is that we did not have a control condition for 
any other negative emotion (see 4.4. for further Discussion).
Limitations in Study 3 include the following: a) we used Likert-adapted 
versions of established clinical instruments (PGSI & SOGS) and b) we did not include 
both PGSI and SOGS in all of our studies, therefore we cannot know if the results 
would converge between the scales. These instruments (PGSI & SOGS) are traditionally
used to classify respondents into discrete categories based on individual scoring (i.e. 
non-problematic gambler, problem gambler, pathological gambler), while our 
continuous Likert-scored measures are not directly comparable to the traditional scoring
system. However, the Likert -adapted PGSI had exactly the right convergent and 
divergent validity with performance measures of emotional intelligence, life 
satisfaction, hope, level of education etc (see Results for Study 3.1). Using a continuous
Likert scoring of the clinical instrument seems to expose its weaknesses and increases 
the statistical power of the analysis in comparison to median splits or other data 
categorization methods that are often used.
Finally, as already stated in 2.1, due to technical and ethical limitations there 
could be some overlap between the study populations, since the method of data 
collection was similar in all studies. Furthermore, as far as we are aware of, there is no 
up-to-date  normative sample that has been collected from the Finnish or international 
gambling population and this makes it difficult to estimate, with absolute certainty, to 
which extent our samples are representative of  the poker playing or gambling 
community as a whole. However, since our studies aimed at studying the population of 
healthy poker players, this does not seem to be such a critical issue (i.e. we are not 
developing clinical instruments per se). Furthermore, as a more technical note, in our 
Appendix 2 we have presented Maximum Likelihood estimated structural models from 
our data. Since these analyses have converged and their Χ² -tests have a p-value of >.05,
they do satisfy the prerequisites of being multinormally distributed (See Byrne, 2012). 
What this implies, in the end, is that our data is most likely representable/ generalizable 
and was collected appropriately.
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4.4 Future directions
Future studies could take several directions. Future research building up on Study 1 will
benefit from simulating actual frustration or anger induced by the poker situations 
themselves, rather than using anger inducing vignettes not-related to the context. More 
research is also needed in order to ascertain whether it is negative emotions in general, 
or (moral) anger specifically, that is detrimental to poker decision-making. In addition, 
Study 1 should be replicated in laboratory conditions to consolidate the poker decision-
making paradigm used. Antonio Damasio (2003; see Stich and Mallon, 2000), among 
others, has suggested that human emotions could be divided into two broad categories: 
primary and secondary (social) emotions. The results of Study 1 were confirmed 
through an interaction effect between the social identity salience manipulation (i.e. eyes 
on the screen) and anger manipulation. This implies that basic and social emotions 
could possibly exert separate effects on System 2 type of processing. Since social 
emotions need to take into consideration the nuances of social situations, it is possible 
that they also need the analytical capabilities of System 2. Social emotions are highly 
context sensitive and hence their rationality depends more or less on explicit strategic 
understanding of the surrounding situations. It is therefore possible that social or moral 
anger takes more resources from System 2, which would otherwise be used in the 
processing of rational economic calculations. Basic emotions (fear, disgust, anger), 
which are related to immediate survival on the other hand would simply override any 
System 2 -level processes completely. For instance, if there was an earthquake while a 
person was playing a poker game, his fear would force him to run out of the building, 
not really caring whether it was the right decision from the perspective of poker. Also, 
to further validate the role of (moral) anger specifically in the context of poker we 
would need to conduct studies that have other negative emotion inductions as control 
conditions. This is a standard practice in social psychology that is usually required step 
before we could conclude with more certainty that it is anger and not just any negative 
emotion that has this disruptive effect on System 2 level decision making.
Study 2 implies that future studies in gambling and gambling pathologies would
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benefit from taking into consideration the personality profiles of healthy normal 
individuals. Future studies should assess which types of personality profiles are more 
susceptible to psycho-pathologies. In a recent study by Van Gelder & De Vries (2014), 
HEXACO was utilized in conjunction with a dual processing model in order to measure
criminal decision-making. In addition, HEXACO could be further utilized in assessing 
decision-making processes in the field of gambling studies and economic psychology as
well. 
Finally, Studies 3.1–3.3 provide numerous implications, directions and 
suggestions for future research. For instance, the SVO measure used in Study 3.2 stems 
from the mathematical tradition in game theory and micro-economics. Furthermore, 
SVO has been extensively validated in empirical contexts. Social Value Orientation had 
no association with PES, implying that the exploitative strategies encouraged by the 
logic of poker are not activated outside the game. Or, stated in other ways, manipulative
character does not benefit in acquiring poker experience. As far as we are aware, there 
are no studies assessing whether poker expertise is domain specific, or whether it has 
domain general effects. In other words, it is unknown if experience in poker is related to
specific gaming strategies / behaviors in general, or whether the skills that are 
developed in poker are only specific to poker (e.g. it has been shown, that chess 
expertise does not influence IQ). To answer these and other similar questions, poker 
experience and poker decision-making behavior should be studied in relation to the 
most common game theoretical measures, like the Ultimatum game, Trust Game or 
Public Goods Game. 
The reason for studying the economic games in conjunction with poker are 
numerous. One of the reasons is that at the moment it is not quite clear whether the 
strategies employed in poker are analogous with other types of “selfishness” decisions 
made in for example in Trust game or the Ultimatum game. As an example In the 
ultimatum game Player A divides, say 10 coins, between himself and Player B. Player B
can then decide whether to accept the number of coins offered to him by player A. If B 
accepts, both get to keep their coins. If B rejects, neither of the participants gets 
anything. It can be ascertained, that experienced poker players in the role of B, are more
likely to accept offers that non-poker players find unfair (offers from 1 to 3 coins), since
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they should be more sensitive to rational decision making in contexts that involve 
money. If on the other hand skills and thinking patterns developed in the context of 
poker are extremely context dependent (i.e., domain specific), then we should not expect
to see any correlation between strategies individuals choose in economic games and 
their poker playing experience. At the moment we have no clue whether skills 
developed in poker are relevant in other contexts as well. 
Studies 3.1 and 3.3 could be further extended by trying to replicate them with a 
full battery of problem gambling measures, and possibly with more sophisticated path 
model-based analyses to gain more insight into the underlying mechanisms of poker. A 
more complex analysis could take into consideration that zero correlations are 
sometimes artifacts stemming from latent clusters that produce opposite effects. For 
instance, it is possible that experienced poker players are divided into two sub-groups: a
sub-group of non-pathological players who experience positive benefits from poker and 
a sub-group of problematic players who actually have only negative effects from the 
game. Just by looking at correlations however, such latent cluster or interaction effects 
would remain unobservable. 
Nonetheless, results that are replicated three times over and that systematically 
suggest that there are no ill-effects associated with gaining high levels of experience in 
poker, need to be taken seriously by the gambling studies community. Especially since 
there is an increasing number of studies which do consistently find strong evidence 
suggesting that the common diagnostic tools for detecting problem gambling need to be 
revised (Stinchfield, 2002, Ladoucer et al., 2000; Orford et al., 2010; Kincaid et al., 
2013; Stone et al., 2014; Goodie et al., 2013) and there have been other studies that 
point to this direction as well, in the context of poker (e.g. Palomäki et al.,2013a)
We still have a lot to learn about the relationship of healthy rational decision-
making and how it gets disrupted and snowballs into something which is defined as an 
addiction. It also seems that the rise of new technologies, like the internet, forces us to 
rethink what addiction or problematic behavior is (for extensive discussion, see: 
Widyanto & Griffiths, 2006).
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5. Conclusions
This thesis succeeded in aims set up in 1.5. Studies 1–3 offer clarifications to the origins
of tilting, mathematically inaccurate decision-making, development of expertise and 
questions related to poker and well-being. Furthermore, we successfully succeeded in 
adjusting the focus of the field of gambling studies by extending the domain from 
clinical populations to include healthy individuals as well.
 The studies presented here imply that there are benefits in revising our 
perspective on poker gambling and poker players. The extensive clinical concentration 
on poker and poker playing communities has obscured other interesting scientific 
perspectives and possible findings. By concentrating more on the decision-making 
aspects and aspects related to expertise development we can gain a deeper 
understanding on human decision-making in general and tie the field of gambling 
studies more closely to cognitive sciences and social and personality psychology as 
well. 
Further discussion of the results implies that the financial losses that are 
associated with online poker gambling is a concern to anyone who decides to actively 
play the game. However, this seems to be a matter of both situational (state) and trait 
factors (i.e. personality), and if psychopathology plays a role, then its magnitude needs 
to be assessed in relation to these other findings as well (i.e. level of poker experience, 
personality, sensitivity to losses, emotional and social situational factors). Problematic 
gambling and pathological behaviors surely exist, but the magnitude of the problem and
the frequency of really problematic behavior among poker players needs to be assessed 
in the context of what is normal. If losing your nerves and feeling angry due to losing 
money is normal human behavior and if going back to the poker table after a losing 
streak is something that is comparable to going to work after a bad day – for the 
professional – , then classifying these behaviors as pathological or problematic is 
questionable from a more scientific perspective. 
It seems that many of the key components related to accumulating poker skills 
and avoiding bad decisions leading to monetary losses are related to emotional self-
regulation, which stems from either extensive training or natural aptitude or both. 
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Keeping this in mind when investigating gamblers and gambling related behaviors will 
greatly benefit the basic decision-making sciences and will add to our understanding on 
how such things as addictions actually develop. It is not enough to classify people as 
mentally ill, if we want to prevent people from becoming mentally ill.
To sum up, the thesis successfully showed that: 1) making investment decisions 
in poker while angry leads to detrimental decisions, 2) emotional stability is important 
in developing poker expertise and 3) developing poker expertise is not associated with 
emotional or social problems, selfishness or hopelessness. This warrants further studies 
conducted on healthy and normal decision-makers in the field of gambling studies.
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APPENDIX 1
Explicit Presentation of the Poker Decision Making Tasks (Dependent Variable)
Detailed descriptions of the five Texas no limit hold ‘em (NLHE) poker decision making tasks/scenarios are presented here. The scenarios involved 
NLHE, since it is currently very likely the most popular and recognized poker game variant. In both scenarios, participants could choose one of two 
options, fold or call, in accordance to the rules of NLHE. 
Poker Terminology Abbreviations and Explanations: 
To fold = To give up your hand 
To call = To match a bet made by an opponent
To bet all-in = To bet all the money/chips one currently has in play
bb = big blind
h = hearts, s = spades, c = clubs, d = diamonds 
As Kh Qc Jd Ts = Ace of spades, King of hearts, Queen of clubs, Jack of diamonds, Ten 
of spades 
Knowing for a fact an opponent's range of possible hands for a given action, one's own hand, and the amount of money/chips invested in the pot, 
enables a mathematical calculation of equity. Here, equity corresponds to the likelihood of a given hand (the hand held by the participant in a given 
scenario) winning against a specified hand range. The expected value of folding is always exactly zero. Thus, calling is mathematically correct if and 
only if its equity is above zero. Correspondingly, folding is mathematically correct if and only if the equity of calling is below zero. PokerStrategy.com 
Equilator (version 1.8) was used to calculate the distribution of equity between the participants’ hand and the opponent’s hand range.
The monetary values are depicted as big blinds, which, in general, correspond to the minimum bet allowed in any given game. Typically, in a NLHE 
game with a maximum buy in of $100, the big blind will be $1. Correspondingly, in a NLHE game with a maximum buy in of $5000, the big blind will
be $50.
Scenario 1
You are holding: 5s, 4s (five of spades, four of spades).
The flop is: Kh, 9s, 6s (king of hearts, nine of spades, six of spades)
In the beginning of the hand, both you and your opponent had 100 bb. Currently, on the flop, the size of the pot is 6 bb, and both you and your 
opponent have 97 bb in your stacks. Your opponent bets all-in.
You know for a fact that your opponent can have anything. In other words, you know for a fact that your opponent's range of possible hands is any 
two cards (or “random”).
What do you do: Call / Fold?
Table 2. Scenario 1 mathematical evaluation.
Player Hand range Equity Money
 (”range strength”) (%)   
Subject [5s, 4s] 46.67 97 bb
Opponent [random / ”any two cards”] 53.33       has bet all-in
Size of the pot 103 bb
(after opponent 
bets all-in)
Calling yields an expected value of 0.4667 x 103 – (1 – 0.4667) x 97 = – 3.66
Scenario 2
You are holding: 2c, 2s (deuce of clubs, deuce of spades)
The flop is: 3s, 4s, 5s (three of spades, four of spades, five of spades)
In the beginning of the hand, both you and your opponent had 150 bb. Currently, on the flop, the size of the pot is 2 bb, and both you and your 
opponent have 149 bb in your stacks. Your opponent bets all-in.
You know for a fact that your opponent can have anything. In other words, you know for a fact that your opponent's range of possible hands is any 
two cards (or “random”).
What do you do: Call / Fold?
Table 3. Scenario 2 mathematical evaluation.
Player Hand range Equity  Money
  (”range strength”) (%)     
Subject [2c, 2s] 59.02              49 bb
Opponent [random / ”any two cards”] 40.98         has bet all-in
Size of the pot 151 bb
(after opponent 
bets all-in)
Calling yields an expected value of 0.5902 x 151 – (1 – 0.5902) x 149 = 28.06
Scenario 3
You are holding: Ts, 8s (ten of spades, eight of spades)
The flop is: Qs, As, 9h (queen of spades, ace of spades, nine of hearts)
In the beginning of the hand, both you and your opponent had 100 bb. Currently, on the flop, the size of the pot is 8 bb, and both you and your 
opponent have 96 bb in your stacks. Your opponent bets all-in.
You know for a fact that your opponent has two “picture cards” (here, “picture cards” refer to Jacks, Queens and Kings – i.e., cards that have 
“pictures of people” in them) in his/her hand – but you do not know anything else. In other words, you know for a fact that your opponent's range of 
possible hands is any two “picture cards” (either two of the same picture card, or two different picture cards, regardless of the suits)
What do you do: Call / Fold?
Table 4. Scenario 3 mathematical evaluation.
Player Hand range Equity  Money
    (”range strength”) (%)     
Subject [Ts, 8s] 44.64               96 bb
Opponent [any two ”picture cards”] 53.36         has bet all-in
Size of the pot 104 bb
(after opponent 
bets all-in)
Calling yields an expected value of 0.4464 x 104 – (1 – 0.4464) x 96 = – 6.72
Scenario 4
You are holding: Jh, Th (jack of hearts, ten of hearts)
The flop is: 3c, 7h, 8h (three of clubs, seven of hearts, eight of hearts)
In the beginning of the hand, both you and your opponent had 100 bb. Currently, on the flop, the size of the pot is 2bb, and both you and your 
opponent have 99 bb in your stacks. Your opponent bets all-in.
You know for a fact that your opponent has Tc, Td (ten of clubs, ten of diamonds) in his/her hand.
What do you do: Call / Fold?
Table 5. Scenario 4 mathematical evaluation.
Player Hand range Equity      Money
(”range strength”) (%)
Subject [Jh, Th] 55                    99 bb
Opponent [Tc, Td] 45   has bet all-in
Size of the pot 101 bb
(after opponent 
bets all-in)
Calling yields an expected value of 0.55 x 101 – (1 – 0.55) x 99 = 11
Scenario 5
You are holding: 9h, 8s (nine of hearts, eight of spades)
The flop is: 6h, 7h, 8c (six of hearts, seven of hearts, eight of clubs)
In the beginning of the hand, both you and your opponent had 100 bb. Currently, on the flop, the size of the pot is 2bb, and both you and your 
opponent have 99 bb in your stacks. Your opponent bets all-in.
You know for a fact that your opponent has Qh, Jh (queen of hearts, jack of hearts) in his/her hand.
What do you do: Call / Fold?
Table 6. Scenario 5 mathematical evaluation.
Player Hand range Equity     Money
 (”range strength”) (%)
Subject [9h, 8s] 52.88                       99 bb
Opponent [Qh, Jh] 47.12       has bet all-in
Size of the pot 101 bb
(after opponent 
bets all-in)
Calling yields an expected value of 0.5288 x 101 – (1 – 0.5288) x 99 = 6.76
APPENDIX 2
Additional statistical analyses to supplement the analyses presented in the main text.
Study 1
We ran several interaction and moderated regression analyses on the data from 
Study 1 to investigate whether Poker Experience would behave differently with 
different emotional manipulations. We did not find anything.
Study 2
We first ran a multiple regression analysis by entering the PES4 as the 
dependent variable and all the HEXACO dimensions as independent variables. We also 
added the respondents age into the model. The results of the analysis are presented in 
Table A2 below. In this analysis only age and Emotional stability were significant 
predictors. This analysis conforms exactly with the analysis presented in the main text.
Table A2. Regression analysis of HEXACO personality traits and age as predictors of 
PES4
Coefficients: Parameter estimates
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 6.47 0.9 7.16 < 0.001 
Honesty-Humility -0.08 0.09 -0.83 n.s.
Emotionality -0.39 0.1 -4.01 < 0.001 
Extraversion -0.02 0.09 -0.26 n.s.
Agreeableness 0.01 0.1 0.14 n.s.
Conscientiousness -0.07 0.1 -0.71 n.s.
Openness -0.11 0.09 -1.26 n.s.
Age 0.02 0.01 2.44 < 0.05
Notes: R² = 0.05, F(7, 469) = 3.71, p <.01
After this we prepared a covariance path analysis with R lavaan. Where we let 
all the covariances between the HEXACO dimensions and PES4 to be freely estimated. 
We used a robust MLM algorithm for our model estimation. After analyzing the 
baseline model, we removed all the non-significant covariances from our model and this
resulted in a restricted covariance path model which had an excellent fit with the data 
(X² (14) = 0.41; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.99; RMSEA < 0.01, 90%  CI [0.00 – 0.04], SRMR 
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= 0.03). See the final model inf Figure A2 below.
Figure A2. Results of the covariance path analysis of the data presented in Study 2Table 5 in the main 
text. The model presented in this figure has a very good fit with the data, X² (14) = 14.44, p = 0.41; CFI 
= 0.99; TLI = 0.99; RMSEA < 0.01, 90%  CI [0.00 – 0.04], SRMR = 0.03). For simplification the error 
terms have been left out. All numbers represent strengths of covariances. Red arrows represent negative 
associations and green arrows represent positive associations.
As a last extra analysis for Study 2 we ran a Path model, where we set each 
PES4 item as a an independent variable and we regressed all the HEXACO dimensions 
on each of the PES4 items. Our a priori model is presented below in Figure A3. After 
we ran the analysis for our a priori model, we removed all the non significant 
associations from the model, which resulted in the final model presented in Figure A4.  
This model had a very food fit with the data as well (X²(4) = 6.313, p. = 0.17; CFI = 
0.99; TLI = 0.98; RMSEA = 0.03, 90% CI: [0.00, 0.01]; SRMR = 0.02). For all practical
purposes the interpretation of these analyses are exactly the same as the analysis that has
already been presented in the main text.
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Figure A3. A priori structural equation model/path analysis for the second analysis of Study 2 (see Table 
6 in the main text). Single headed arrows going from one squared box to another represent regression 
paths. Single headed arrows pointing to boxes without being connected to another box represent 
measurement errors. Curved double headed arrows represent covariances.
Figure A4. Path analysis / structural equation model showing only the significant connections between 
HEXACO dimensions of Exrtoversion (X) and Emotionality (E) and each individual item of PES4 scale. 
The model had a good fit with the data (X²(4) = 6.313, p. = 0.17; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.98; RMSEA = 0.03,
90% CI: [0.00, 0.01]; SRMR = 0.02)
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Study 3.1
We ran a covariance path analysis for the data presented in the main text under Study 
3.1 (see Table 7). Again, after removing the statistically non-significant paths, the model
had an extremely good fit with the data  (X²(7) = 3.48, p. = 0.83; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 
1.04; RMSEA < 0.01, 90% CI: [0.00, 0.03]; SRMR = 0.01). Final covariance path 
model is presented below in Figure A5. 
Figure A5 Covariance path model for Study 3.1. All double headed arrows represent standardized 
covariances between variables.This model had a very good fit with the data  (X²(7) = 3.48, p. = 0.83; 
CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.99; RMSEA < 0.01, 90% CI: [0.00, 0.03]; SRMR = 0.01). PGSI = problem 
gambling severity index, PES4 = Poker Experience Scale, RMET = Reading the mind in the eyes task, 
SRN = self rumination, SRX= self reflection, HOPE = Hope Scale, S2L = Sensitivity to Losses. For 
simplification, the error markers have been left out.
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Study 3.3
We ran a covariance path analysis for the data presented in the main text under 
Study 3.3 (see Table 9). After removing the statistically non-significant paths, the model
had an extremely good fit with the data  (X²(4) = 1.26, p. = 0.86; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 
1.03; RMSEA < 0.01, 90% CI: [0.00, 0.03]; SRMR = 0.01). Final covariance path 
model is presented below in Figure A6. – What the results, when presented graphically, 
show nicely is the fact that poker experience is not associated with any of the measures 
we used, except for the slight negative (b = -0.09) association with alienation (i.e. 
experience in poker is beneficial since it seems to buffer against alienation and social 
isolation)
Figure A6 Covariance path model for Study 3.3. All double headed arrows represent standardized 
covariances between variables. This model had a very good fit with the data  (X²(4) = 1.26, p. = 0.86; CFI
= 0.99; TLI = 1.03; RMSEA < 0.01, 90% CI: [0.00, 0.03]; SRMR = 0.01). SC= Self-Control, PES = 
Poker Experience Scale, EI = Emotional Intelligence, SWB = Social Wellbeing, MosA =Mos Alienation, 
SANM = Srole's Anomie Scale. For simplification, the error markers have been left out.
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